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STATE TAXATION OF GROSS
RECEIPTS AND THE NEGATIVE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
David F. Shores*
Occasionally, a court renders an opinion which is not merely open to
serious question but is astonishingly incoherent. Constitutional limitations
on state taxation of interstate commerce have produced more than their
fair share of such opinions.' The United States Supreme Court, itself, has
characterized its decisions in this area as a "tangled underbrush." 2 Its
recent decision in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State De-
partment of Revenue' was just such a case.
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law; B.A. 1965,
J.D. 1967, University of Iowa; L.L.M. (Taxation) 1969, Georgetown University.
The author thanks Professor Jennifer Brooks, William Mitchell College of Law,
for many helpful comments.
1. In Justice Scalia's view the commerce clause decisions limiting state
taxation of interstate commerce have "made no sense." He characterized this entire
area of commerce clause jurisprudence as "impoverished territory." Tyler Pipe
Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260, 265 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Others agree. Leading commentators have characterized the
decisions as based on "tenuous distinctions," Lockhart, A Revolution in State
Taxation of Commerce?, 65 MINm. L. REv. 1025, 1030 (1981), and on "insubstantial
and pointless formalism." P. HA T AN, FEDERAL LIrvITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL
TAXATION 88 (1981). Many of the cases criticized in these commentaries were based
on a rule of tax immunity for interstate commerce which was rejected by the Court
in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). However, as discussed
below, many distinctions engendered by the tax immunity rule remain. See infra
notes 40, 81, and text accompanying note 145.
Further evidence of the deplorable state of the decisional law is provided by
the fact that two leading authorities do not agree on how one of the most important
limitations on state taxing power, the multiple tax doctrine, applies. One claims
the doctrine is breached when an interstate activity is potentially subject to multiple
taxation. The other insists only actual taxation by two or more states is prohibited.
Compare J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATioN-COR'ORATE INCOME AND FRANCmSE
TAXES 120 (1983) ("In 1980, the Court ... apparently put the matter to rest by
reaffirming the risk test of multiple taxation.") with P. HARTMAN, at 36 (" [T]he
current version of multiple burdens doctrines (sic) as a commerce clause obstruction
to a tax requires the showing of an actual multiple tax burden.") (emphasis in
the original). See also P. HARTMAN, at 82.
2. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
457 (1959) (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940)).
3. 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
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Ten years prior to Tyler Pipe, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady,4 the Court recognized that commerce clause limitations on state
taxing power had "no relationship to economic realities," and stood "only
as a trap for the unwary draftsman." 5 In an effort to rationalize this
branch of commerce clause jurisprudence, it overturned the tax immunity
doctrine which had been developed by case law over a period spanning
one hundred years. 6 Tyler Pipe deserves close examination because it was
wrongly decided 7 and because it represents the court's failure, in Complete
Auto, to place commerce clause analysis of state taxing power on a sound
footing.8 That failure supports Justice Scalia's suggestion that the Court
jettison the so-called negative commerce clause doctrine under which it
decides if a state tax unduly burdens interstate commerce.9
4. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
5. Id. at 279.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 11-39.
7. Tyler Pipe was wrongly decided in that the Court reaffirmed as a
commerce clause objective the prohibition of multiple taxation of interstate com-
merce, but adopted a method of analysis which failed to achieve that objective.
See infra text following note 107.
8. Complete Auto and the expectations it engendered are discussed below.
See infra text following note 30.
9. The negative commerce clause doctrine, also referred to as the dormant
commerce clause doctrine, holds that the constitutional grant of power to Congress
to regulate interstate commerce implies a limitation on state power to regulate or
otherwise burden commerce which must be explicated by the Court so long as
Congress remains silent. For a fuller explanation see L. TRmE, AmERcAN CoN-
sTrrtoNAL LAW 325-26 (1978). Justice Scalia rejected this doctrine and argued
that "The historical record provides no grounds for reading the Commerce Clause
to be other than what it says-an authorization for Congress to regulate commerce."
Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 263. "Congress' silence," he said, "is just that-silence
.... " Id. at 262 (quoting Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987)).
Original intent as a tool of constitutional construction is a slippery concept. It
seldom, if ever, is irrefutably demonstrated by the historical record, and Professor
Hartman has argued:
"Whatever may have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution
... the commerce clause undoubtedly has been one of the most significant
provisions in the Constitution in forging the confederation into a viable
Nation, not only through the unifying force of that clause but also by
its restraint upon state action that would unduly hinder national economic
growth."
P. IARTMAN, supra note 1, at 18.
Since evidence of intent is ambiguous, neither mandating nor ruling out the
negative commerce clause doctrine, the question is whether application of the doctrine
to state taxing power represents wise interpretation of the clause, or usurpation of
legislative power. If, as many seem to agree (see supra note 1 and accompanying
text), the Court's state tax cases have been characterized chiefly by capricious
distinctions and haphazard development, it is very difficult to view the negative
commerce clause as wise constitutional interpretation. The inability to produce a
coherent body of decisional law may indicate an institutional infirmity. As the
Court has recently stated, "[Tihe uneven course of decisions in this field reflects 2
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The purpose of this article is to propose a modest realignment of the
framework for commerce clause analysis of state taxing power. The proposal
grew out of an observation by Justice Rutledge'0 that while due process
and commerce clause limitations on state taxing power overlap, clear analysis
requires that they be viewed independently rather than collapsed into a
single conception. The Supreme Court has failed to heed this advice, and
in recent years it has exacerbated the situation by sometimes collapsing
into one the, previously separate, commerce clause concerns of discrimi-
nation and multiple taxation. To understand why the suggested realignment
would contribute to the development of a coherent body of decisional law
based on economic realities rather than meaningless distinctions, it is nec-
essary to examine briefly what has gone before.
I. BACKGROUND - A HISTORICAL SKETCH
Much has been written about the evolution of commerce clause lim-
itations on state taxation of interstate commerce." What follows is a very
cursory outline.
The commerce clause states that: "Congress shall have power ... to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
*..,12 Use of the negative commerce clause doctrine, assumes that when
Congress has not exercised its power to regulate interstate commerce it
nonetheless intends that such commerce be free of undue burdens imposed
the difficulties of reconciling unrestricted access to the national market with each
State's authority to collect its fair share of revenues from interstate commercial
activity." American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 269 (1987).
Perhaps the problems of state taxation of interstate commerce simply cannot
be resolved by the Court through case law with its dependence on general principles.
If, as Justice Frankfurter put it, "nice distinctions are to be expected," in delineating
the scope of state taxing power, Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450, 473 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Galveston H. & S.A.R. Co.,
v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 225 (1908)), perhaps they should be made through the
legislative or regulatory process. Although legislative action is certainly not precluded
by the negative corkimerce clause, it is discouraged. Congress will be less likely to
address the issues of state taxation of interstate commerce so long as the Court
does, even in its fumbling manner. If the negative commerce clause makes effective
solutions to pressing problems of state taxation less likely, it can hardly be defended
as wise interpretation.
While Justice Scalia's view may seem radical today, it is on all fours with
that of Chief Justice Taney who could find no support in the commerce clause
for invalidating any state tax. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
10. See infra, note 40.
11. See P. HARTmAN, supra note 1, at 52-101; J. HELLERsTEIN, supra note
1, at 99-126; Lockhart, supra note 1, at 1025-1038; Shores, State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce-Quiet Revolution or Much Ado About Nothing?, 38 TAx
L. Rnv. 127, 129-45 (1982).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
19891
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by the states. 3 For one hundred and fifteen years, the Court has been
deciding when the state tax burden on interstate commerce is "undue"
and therefore violative of the negative commerce clause. 4
The Court, over the years, has based the commerce clause limitations
on state taxing power on three general principles, two of which survive
to the present day." These principles are referred to as the tax immunity
doctrine,' 6 the discrimination doctrine,' 7 and the multiple tax doctrine. 8
The tax immunity doctrine, explicitly abandoned in 1977,19 held that in-
terstate commerce was immune from state taxation. Since interstate com-
merce draws its sustenance from an economy nurtured at the expense of
state as well as federal government, however, complete immunity from
state taxation makes no sense. The Supreme Court succinctly stated, "it
was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in
interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden .
13. See L. TRmE, supa note 9, at 325-26 (1978).
14. The first decision in which a state tax on interstate commerce was held
to violate the commerce clause was Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 232 (1872). For an analysis of this case see, Shores, supra note 11, at 131-
32.
15. Some might argue that the only surviving principle is that which prohibits
discrimination against interstate commerce. Cf. J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at
122-23, 126. While the scope and effect of general principles are almost invariable
topics for lively debate in any area of law, the law seldom degenerates to the point
where the very existence of a general principle is open to serious question. There
is a critical need for well-reasoned Supreme Court decisions in this area.
16. The tax immunity doctrine can be traced to Case of the State Freight
Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872), and was explicitly adopted in Robbins v.
Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887). It flatly prohibited any state
tax on interstate commerce. It would seem that since taxation of interstate commerce
was per se unlawful, no further limitation should have been necessary. As discussed
below, the immunity doctrine never provided a complete shield from state taxation.
See infra text accompanying note 21.
17. The Court has observed that "The prohibition against discriminatory
treatment of interstate commerce follows inexorably from the basic purpose of the
(Commerce) Clause." Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm., 429 U.S. 318, 329
(1977). The discrimination principle was probably first applied to invalidate a state
tax in Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
18. Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872) seemed
to express some concern for the harmful effects of multiple taxation. See Shores,
supra note 11, at 131-32. It was not until 1938 that the Court explicitly recognized
multiple taxation as an important factor in commerce clause analysis. Western Live
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 258 (1938). See Shores, supra note
11, at 137.
19. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), overruling
Spector Motor Serv. Inc., v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), a factually similar
case in which the tax immunity rule had been applied to invalidate a tax on an
interstate business.
20. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
4
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To limit the scope of the tax immunity doctrine the Court applied a
direct-indirect test under which interstate commerce was immune from direct
but not indirect state taxes. 21 This test spawned many absurd distinctions
which exposed the Court's commerce clause jurisprudence to ridicule if
not contempt.? Perhaps the height of absurdity was reached in the Railway
Express cases. 23 Virginia had applied its "doing business" tax, measured
by gross receipts, to Railway Express Agency. Although the tax only applied
to gross receipts attributable to activities within the state, it was held invalid
as a direct tax on interstate commerce because the business activities
conducted within the state were part and parcel of the taxpayer's interstate
business. 24
The Virginia legislature revised the statute by changing the formal
subject matter of the tax from "doing business" within the state to the
"intangible property" 25 and "going concern value ' 26 connected with the
taxpayer's business activities within the state. Again, the tax was measured
by fairly apportioned gross receipts. 27 Since the tax was now on intangible
property owned by a concern engaged in interstate business it was viewed
as an indirect rather than a direct tax on interstate commerce and when
challenged, was upheld.? The practical economic burden of the tax was,
of course, unchanged. Only the words had been altered, but using the
"magic words" made constitutional an otherwise unconstitutional tax.29
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,30 the Court reviewed these
and other cases in which the tax immunity rule had been applied and
concluded that "[t]he reason for attaching constitutional significance to a
semantic difference is difficult to discern." 31 "There is no economic con-
sequence," said the Court, "that follows necessarily from the use of...
particular words, ... and a focus on that formalism merely obscures the
question whether the tax produces a forbidden effect. ' 32 The immunity
rule was explicitly rejected" in favor of other decisions which
21. See J. HELLERSTEiN, supra note 1, at 103.
22. See supra note 1.
23. Railway Express Agency, Inc., v. Virginia (Railway Express 1), 347 U.S.
359 (1954); Railway Express Agency, Inc., v. Virginia (Railway Express I1), 358
U.S. 434 (1959).
24. Railway Express I, 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
25. Railway Express II, 358 U.S. 434, 438 (1959).
26. Id. at 440.
27. Id. at 438.
28. Railway Express I, 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
29. The Court neither changed this reality nor added to its own dignity by
asserting that more was involved than "the use of magic words." Id. at 441.
30. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
31. Id. at 285.
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considered not the formal language of the tax statute but rather its practical
effect, and have sustained a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when
the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate com-
merce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the state.',
The Court's approval of this four-part test for evaluating a tax under
the commerce clause, and its rejection of the tax immunity rule were
heralded as a revolution in state taxation." Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana,16 decided four years after Complete Auto, raised the question
whether the revolution was real. In an earlier article, this author commented:
Commonwealth Edison suggests that the Court will allow meaningless
distinctions based on the formal subject matter of a tax to narrow the
scope of the multiple tax doctrine as applied to taxes measured by gross
receipts.... It took the Court one hundred years to realize that it could
not simultaneously maintain the tax immunity rule, achieve goals incom-
patible with that rule, and develop coherent precedents. One can hope
that it will not repeat that process with the multiple tax doctrine."
Tyler Pipe confirms what Commonwealth Edison suggested. Complete
Auto did not signal the dawn of principled analysis for state tax cases.
Instead, the Court continues to function without the tax immunity rule in
much the same way as it had functioned with the rule. "Magic words"
may be as critical under some recent cases as under the Railway Express
cases.38 The only difference is that in the Railway Express cases the magic
words were critical to applying the tax immunity rule, while they are now
critical to applying the multiple tax doctrine, or, more precisely, to an
outgrowth of that doctrine, the "internal consistency test."'39 Before ex-
amining Tyler Pipe and demonstrating that this is true, it will be useful
to discuss briefly some current problems in the Court's approach to issues
of state taxation and their relationship to the four-part test of Complete
Auto.
34. Id. at 279. One of the prior decisions specifically approved was General
Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964). See Complete Auto, 430 U.S.
at 279. Tyler Pipe, however, endorsed Justice Goldberg's dissent in General Motors
(see Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 242), and indicated the General Motors holding was
overruled to the extent inconsistent with the Court's most recent pronouncements.
Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 248. The Court's vacillation in evaluating precedent suggests
that its state tax decisions continue to be devoid of principled analysis.
35. Lockhart, supra note 1, at 1038 ("[R]ecent decisions signal the end to
the Formal Rule in all of its tax manifestations."); see also J. HELLERSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 126-27; P. HAgRgm , supra note 1, at 88-90.
36. 453 U.S. 609 (1981). Commonwealth Edison upheld a Montana severance
tax measured by total gross receipts from interstate sales of coal mined in Montana.
For an analysis of this decision see Shores, supra note 11, at 150-55.
37. Shores, supra note 11, at 169.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 92 and 155. See also infra note 40.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 99-100.
[Vol. 54
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II. SOME CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT'S STATE TAX DECISIONS
A. The Relationship of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses
One problem which has long plagued state tax decisions has been the
Court's failure to separate due process from commerce clause considera-
tions. 40 While analysis based upon fusing due process and commerce clause
40. For example, in Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. 159 (1983), the Court stated: "The Due Process and Commerce Clauses of
the Constitution do not allow a State to tax income arising out of interstate
activities-even on a proportional basis-unless there is a 'minimum connection"
or "nexus" between the interstate activities and the taxing state . . ."' Id. at 165-
66 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Texas, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37
(1980)). Previously, the Court had stated:
The Due Process Clause places two restrictions on a State's power to tax
income generated by activities of an interstate business. First, no tax may
be imposed unless there is some minimal connection between those activities
and the taxing State .... Second, the income attributed to the State for
tax purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing
State.
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978) (citations omitted). The
commerce clause nexus requirement adds nothing to the due process requirement.
The fusion of the due process and commerce clauses reflected by Container
Corporation is a holdover from pre-Complete Auto decisions in which both clauses
were viewed as relating to the question of whether the state had power to tax a
given transaction. This approach is illustrated by McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co.,
322 U.S. 327 (1944), where the Court held Arkansas could not apply its sales tax
to a sale in Tennessee by a Tennessee vendor to an Arkansas buyer even though
the goods were delivered in Arkansas because: "The very purpose of the Commerce
Clause was to create an area of free trade among the several States." Id. at 330.
In a related case, General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944),
the Court upheld Iowa's use tax as applied to goods purchased in Minnesota and
delivered in Iowa to an Iowa purchaser, observing that the use tax was "a non-
discriminatory excise laid on all personal property consumed in Iowa." Id. at 338.
The Dilworth view that commerce clause analysis goes to the existence of a state's
power to tax was logical under the tax immunity rule, since, at least in theory,
the State had no power to impose a direct tax on interstate commerce. Justice
Rutledge, who had no sympathy for the immunity rule, viewed the existence of
state power as a due process issue, anterior to the commerce clause question of
whether state taxing power was exercised in a way that unduly burdened commerce.
Dissenting in Dilworth and concurring in General Trading he wrote:
The Court's different treatment of the two taxes does not result from any
substantial difference in the facts under which they are levied or the effects
they may have on interstate trade. It arises rather from applying different
constitutional provisions to the substantially identical taxes, in the one
case to invalidate that of Arkansas, in the other to sustain that of Iowa.
Due process destroys the former. Absence of undue burden upon interstate
commerce sustains the latter.
Id. at 352 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Now that the tax immunity rule has been
repudiated there is no basis for viewing the existence of state taxing power as a
commerce clause issue. Doing so can only serve to muddy the waters.
1989]
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concepts does not necessarily produce bad results, it does contribute to a
lack of clarity and sets the stage for fundamental error 4'
The due process clause provides that no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law. 42 As applied to state taxation, the
due process clause is concerned with whether the state has power to tax.
Essentially, the issue comes down to whether there is some relationship
between the taxpayer and the state which justifies the tax. As the Court
has stated: "The simple but controlling question is whether the state has
given anything for which it can ask return. ' 43 Obviously, one state cannot
impose an income tax, or any other tax, on a resident of another state
who has no connection with the taxing state. But, if some connection or
nexus exists, for example, the nonresident has income from sources within
the taxing state, the due process requirement is met."
Properly viewed, the commerce clause is relevant only after the due
process requirement is met. It poses the question: Has the state exercised
its power to tax in a way that unduly burdens interstate commerce? The
two constitutional limitations overlap in that, whenever a state violates due
process by attempting to tax interstate commerce with which it has no
nexus, the commerce must be connected with some other state and that
state has power to tax. If the second state exercises its power to tax,
duplicative taxation will result and commerce will be unduly burdened. In
other words, any tax on interstate commerce that violates the due process
clause will also violate the commerce clause, because it creates a danger
of multiple taxation and thus creates an undue burden.4 The due process
limitation can, therefore, rationally be viewed as subsumed in the commerce
clause limitation.
Apparently this was the Court's view in Complete Auto. The first and
fourth prongs of the four-part commerce clause test adopted in Complete
Auto look to whether "the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial
nexus with the taxing state ... and is fairly related to the services provided
41. "Due Process" and "commerce clause" conceptions are not always
sharply separable .... To some extent they overlap. If there is a want
of due process to sustain the tax, by that fact alone any burden the tax
imposes on the commerce among the states becomes "undue." ...
[A]Ithough the two notions cannot always be separated, clarity of con-
sideration and of decision would be promoted if the two issues are ap-
proached, where they are presented, at least tentatively as if they were
separate and distinct, not intermingled ones.
International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 353 (1944)
(Rutledge, J., concurring).
42. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
43. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
44. In Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., a Wisconsin tax on dividends paid
by a Delaware corporation out of earnings attributable to business activities in
Wisconsin was upheld. Id.
45. See supra note 41.
[Vol. 54
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by the state." '46 As previously discussed, nexus relates also to the due
process question of whether the state has power to tax.
The fair relationship test of the fourth prong becomes important only
if a nexus exists. It asks whether the power to tax has been exercised in
a way that is reasonably related to the nexus. As recently described by
the Court,
Beyond the threshold (nexus) requirement, the fourth prong of the Complete
Auto Transit test imposes the additional limitation that the measure of
the tax must be reasonably related to the extent of the contact, since it
is the activities or presence of the taxpayer in the State that may properly
be made to bear a "just share of State tax burden." 4
At best, the fourth prong provides a nebulous standard which operates as
a refinement of the nexus test. Arguably, it is automatically satisfied
whenever the nexus requirement is satisfied and adds nothing to commerce
clause analysis. 41
Whatever its precise meaning, the fourth prong and the nexus test of
the first prong, to which it relates, both go to the due process question
of power to tax. In one post-Complete Auto decision, the Court specifically
recognized the first and fourth prongs as due process rather than commerce
clause tests. 49 Complete Auto and other recent decisions,50 however, fused
due process and commerce clause concerns. That is unfortunate. Minimally,
separating the analysis of whether a state has power to tax under the due
process clause, from the analysis of whether a state has imposed an undue
burden on interstate commerce, would help clarify why the Court concluded
a state tax either was or was not constitutional. Beyond that, it might
contribute to the Court's insights and have a positive effect on its con-
clusions.
The second and third prongs of the Complete Auto test are of central
importance to commerce clause analysis. They alone impose requirements
46. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
47. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981) (quot-
ing Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
48. Id. at 645 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272 (1978). The Court stated:
The Due Process Clause places two restrictions on a State's power to tax
income generated by activities of an interstate business. First, no tax may
be imposed unless there is some minimal connection between those activities
and the taxing State .... Second, the income attributed to the State for
tax purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing
state.
Id. at 272-73 (citations omitted).
50. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, where
the Court stated: "The Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution
do not allow a State to tax income arising out of interstate activities-even on a
proportional basis-unless there is a 'minimal connection' or 'nexus' between the
interstate activities and the taxing.State." Id. at 165-66.
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under the commerce clause which are not duplicated elsewhere in the
Constitution,51 and they reflect the longstanding commerce clause require-
ments that state taxes be fairly apportioned and nondiscriminatory.
B. The Relationship Between the Multiple Tax Doctrine and the Fair
Apportionment Requirement
Some commentators have suggested that since the four-part test of
Complete Auto does not specifically refer to the multiple tax doctrine, that
doctrine no longer exists.5 Since the Court neither advanced nor repudiated
the multiple tax doctrine, the argument must be that the theory of Complete
Auto implies its repudiation. This argument is unpersuasive. The Court
51. In his Tyler Pipe dissent, Justice Scalia suggested the antidiscrimination
function of the commerce clause is duplicated by the privileges and immunities
clause, U.S. CoNsT., art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, which provides that the citizens of each
state are entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states.
Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 265. However, it has been recognized since 1898 that a
corporation is not a citizen for purposes of this clause. Blake v. McClang, 172
U.S. 239 (1898). Similarly, the Court has held that a corporation is not a citizen
for purposes of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Coop. Mktg. Ass'n, 276 U.S.
71 (1928). Most taxes on interstate commerce are paid by corporations which can
look only to the commerce clause for protection from discriminatory state taxation.
It is arguable that one purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is to promote harmonious relationships among states within the federal
system. State taxes which discriminate against taxpayers from out-of-state are not
conducive to such relationships, and thus may violate the equal protection clause.
See Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc., v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1958) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Department of Revenue v. Amrep Corp., 358 So. 2d 1343 (Fla.
1978). Although this argument would seem to merit serious consideration, it has
received little attention (perhaps because discrimination against out-of-state taxpayers
is normally challenged under the commerce clause), and has never taken root. See
Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 667 n.21 (1981).
Cf., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985). One important
difference in holding a discriminatory tax unconstitutional under the equal protection
clause rather than the commerce clause is that Congress can repudiate a Supreme
Court decision based on the latter, but not the former. This Congressional power
with respect to commerce clause decisions flows from the fact they are based on
a presumption of Congressional intent, and are authoritative only so long as Congress
remains silent. See supra note 9. It has been suggested that Congress may have
power to overturn a Supreme Court decision which affects interstate commerce
even where the decision is based on a constitutional provision other than the
commerce clause. See ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307,
331 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Cf. Id. at 331, 349-50 (O'Conner, J.,
dissenting).
52. Nowak & Rotunda, Sales and Use Tax Credits, Discrimination Against
Interstate Commerce, and the Useless Multiple Tax Concept, 20 U. C. DAvis L.
RPv. 273, 308 (1987). As the title suggests, the authors further assert that demise
of the multiple tax doctrine was a good thing. For an explanation of why their
analysis fails to support this assertion see infra note 136.
[Vol. 54
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did refer to fair apportionment, and in theory, no fairly apportioned tax
creates an undue risk of multiple taxation. Specifically requiring that a tax
be fairly apportioned and that it also avoid the risk of multiple taxation
would have been redundant. In short, the fair apportionment prong is
simply another label for the multiple tax doctrine. In a post-Complete Auto
case, the Court made this abundantly clear when it stated:
It is a commonplace of constitutional jurisprudence that multiple taxation
may well be offensive to the Commerce Clause. In order to prevent multiple
taxation of interstate commerce, this Court has required that taxes be
apportioned among taxing jurisdictions .... Otherwise there would be
multiple taxation of interstate operations."
The failure of some decisions to deal adequately with the risk of
multiple taxation,5 4 can be explained as the product of faulty analysis15
and the Court's long held view that apportionment is an imprecise process
which sometimes does not eliminate totally the risk of multiple taxation . 6
It does not support the argument of some commentators that "the re-
quirement of apportionment was not established to avoid the possibility
of multiple taxation, ' 57 and the Court has stated that is exactly why it
was established. 8
C. The Relationship Between of the Discrimination and the Multiple
Tax Doctrines
As previously discussed, 9 due process requirements relating to taxation
of interstate commerce can be submerged into the commerce clause re-
quirements, although doing so tends to hinder rather than help analyses.
A similar phenomenon exists with respect to the multiple tax and discrim-
ination doctrines. Traditionally applied, the discrimination doctrine demands
substantially equal treatment of interstate and intrastate business under the
tax laws of a given state. These tax laws are evaluated without regard to
how they interact with those that either have been or may be adopted by
other states.60
53. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1979).
54. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (upholding a single
factor apportionment formula based on sales when most states used a three factor
formula based on payroll, property and sales).
55. See Shores, supra note 11, at 158-62.
56. See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
57. Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 52, at 298.
58. See supra note 53 and text accompanying; see also Container Corp. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 185 (1983) ("[Clonsistent application of the fair
apportionment standard can generally mitigate, if not eliminate, double taxation
2). ).
59. See supra note 40 and text accompanying.
60. See infra note .130 and accompanying text. See also Tyler Pipe Indus.
v. Washington, 483 U.S. 210, 254-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part, concurring
in part).
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In Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily,61 for example, a
Louisiana use tax was struck down because it applied to second-hand
equipment purchased outside the state for use within the state, while the
compensatory62 sales tax did not apply to second-hand equipment purchased
within the state. A Louisiana taxpayer could, therefore, reduce his taxes
by purchasing second-hand equipment within rather than without the state.
Such favoritism for local transactions, the Court observed, departs from
the equality required by prior decisions and discriminates in violation of
the commerce clause.
The multiple tax doctrine focuses on the law of the taxing state and
law that any other state having power to tax either has adopted or may
adopt,63 and asks whether the tax laws combine to impose an undue burden
on property used in interstate commerce or an activity conducted in interstate
commerce. In other words, it asks whether an undue burden would result
if all states having power to tax a given thing or a given activity exercised
their power and actually imposed a tax.
Although the multiple tax doctrine has traditionally been viewed as
independent of the discrimination doctrine,64 Northwestern States Portland
61. 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
62. For a discussion of compensating taxes see infra text following note 80.
63. It has been argued, unpersuasively in the author's opinion, that only
actual multiple taxation violates the multiple tax doctrine. See P. HARTMAN, supra
note 1. Under this view any state which meets the nexus requirement of the due
process clause can tax an item in full without violating the multiple tax doctrine
so long as no other state actually taxes the same item. If a second state also has
a nexus with the item in question its power to tax would present no multiple tax
issue until exercised. If the second state actually exercised its power and imposed
a tax, the power of the first state would be diminished proportionately. In short,
the power of any state to tax an item would expand and contract depending upon
whether other states also having power to tax did or did not exercise their power.
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980), Mobil argued
Vermont could not tax any part of certain dividend income because it was taxable
in full by New York. The Commissioner argued that since New York had chosen
not to tax the dividend income, no issue of multiple taxation existed. The Court
said: "We agree with Mobil that the constitutionality of a Vermont tax should
not depend on the vagaries of New York tax policy." Id. at 444. The Vermont
tax was upheld because Vermont and New York could each tax a portion of the
dividend income and Vermont taxed no more than a reasonable portion.
64. See J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
The vice of the statute as applied to receipts from interstate sales is that
the tax includes in its measure, without apportionment, receipts derived
from activities in interstate commerce; and that the exaction is of such a
character that if lawful it may in substance be laid to the fullest extent
by States in which the goods are sold as well as those in which they are
manufactured. Interstate commerce would thus be subjected to the risk
of a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed, and
which the commerce clause forbids. We have repeatedly held that such a
tax is a regulation of, and a burden upon, interstate commerce prohibited
[Vol. 54
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/3
STATE TAXATION
Cement Co. v. Minnesota,6 s raised a question concerning that perception.
The Court upheld a tax on income derived from interstate business con-
ducted within the state because the tax neither discriminated against in-
terstate commerce (intrastate business was subject to an equal tax on its
income), nor subjected it to an undue burden (since income was fairly
apportioned). 66 In reaching that conclusion the Court stated, "[A] state
[may not] impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce
either by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business, or by
subjecting interstate commerce to the burden of 'multiple taxation."' 67
Northwestern Cement suggested, however unclearly, that multiple tax-
ation is a form of discrimination, and provides no independent basis for
finding an undue burden. In Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair' 8 Iowa
imposed a tax on income derived from an interstate business conducted
partly in Iowa. Income was apportioned according to sales whereas all
other states with a similar tax, apportioned income according to payroll,
property, and sales. The Court rejected the taxpayer's (an Illinois cor-
poration selling in Iowa) argument that the Iowa tax created a risk of
multiple taxation violative of the commerce clause. Justice Powell, dis-
senting, determined that Iowa's use of its single-factor apportionment for-
mula when considering the use by all other states of the three-factor formula,
created a risk of multiple tax burdens on out-of-state corporations selling
in Iowa.69 He therefore concluded that "the single-factor sales formula
necessarily discriminates against out-of-state manufacturers. ' 70 Had Justice
Powell's view prevailed, it would have shown clearly that the risk of
by Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. The opinion of the State Supreme
Court stresses the generality and nondiscriminatory character of the ex-
action, but it is settled that this will not save the tax if it directly burdens
interstate commerce.
Id. at 311-12.
65. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
66. Id. at 461.
67. Id. at 458.
68. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
69. See id. at 289 n.4. The multiple burden is easily demonstrated through
an illustration drawn from an example used by Justice Powell. Id. at 284 n.2.
Assume an Iowa corporation with all payroll and property in Iowa, and an Illinois
corporation with all payroll and property in Illinois, which uses the three factor
formula. Each corporation makes one half of its sales in Iowa and one half in
Illinois. Income of the Iowa corporation would be apportioned 50% to Iowa since
50% of its sales were in Iowa, and 16.67% to Illinois (50% + 0% + 0% =
50% + 3 = 16.67%). Income of the Illinois corporation would be apportioned
50% to Iowa and 83.33% to Illinois (50% + 100% + 100% = 250% + 3 =
83.33%). Thus the Illinois corporation would pay tax on 133% of its income while
the Iowa corporation would pay on only 67% of its income.
70. Id. at 292.
1989]
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multiple taxation is a form of discrimination.' From a purely theoretical
standpoint it, makes no difference whether the risk of multiple taxation
is dealt with under the discrimination doctrine, or under a separate multiple
tax doctrine. Either way, a tax that subjects interstate commerce to the
risk of multiple taxation is invalid. For clear analysis, however, it seems
helpful to keep discrimination questions arising under the laws of a single
state separate from multiple taxation questions caused by the interaction
of the laws of all states in which an interstate business is conducted.
Although the point is a minor one, the Court should take whatever pre-
cautions it can to avoid the confusion that has characterized many of its
state tax decisions.72 As discussed below, fusion of the multiple tax and
discrimination doctrines materialized in Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty,73 and
may have contributed to the failed analysis in Tyler Pipe.74
71. It has been suggested that collapsing the multiple tax doctrine into the
discrimination doctrine is nothing new, having been suggested in a number of
earlier dissenting opinions, and that doing so "leaves the present posture of Supreme
Court decisions ... essentially unchanged." J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION-
Cou'oaAEm INco E AND FRANcmsE TAXEs, at S-xxix (1987 supp.). Professor Hell-
erstein points out that Justice Black viewed the commerce clause as prohibiting
only taxes which discriminate against interstate commerce, id. at S-xxix n.26, and
that "the multiple tax doctrine is part of the rubric of the prohibition by the
Commerce Clause of discriminatory taxation." Id. However, Justice Black's view
of multiple taxation was in no sense similar to that of Justice Powell. Black opposed
the multiple tax doctrine on substantive grounds. In J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v.
Storen, 304 U.S. 307, (1938), he dissented from the Court's holding that an Indiana
tax violated the commerce clause because of the risk of multiple taxation, stating:
"only Congress has the power to formulate rules, regulations and laws to protect
interstate commerce from merely possible future unfair burdens." Id. at 328 (em-
phasis in original). Unlike Justice Powell who found unconstitutional discrimination
resulting from the "prospect of multiple burdens," Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S.
at 289 n.4, Justice Black believed such a prospect to be entirely benign-or at
least as presenting no problem with which the Court could properly deal. In short,
Justice Black repudiated the multiple tax doctrine in no uncertain terms. Justice
Powell would have enforced it as a branch of the discrimination doctrine, and in
so doing would have broken new ground.
As discussed infra in text accompanying notes 96-99, Justice Powell was
eventually able to implement his view that the risk of multiple taxation is a form
of discrimination. Whether collapsing the multiple tax doctrine into the discrimi-
nation doctrine will have an impact on substantive law is unknown and unknowable.
In theory Professor Hellerstein is clearly correct. There is no necessary impact. It
seems probable, however, that the lack of clear analysis engendered by fusing the
two doctrines will adversely affect the outcome of many cases. It is hard to imagine
how the Court could have decided Tyler Pipe as it did if it had allowed the multiple
tax doctrine to operate independently. See infra text following note 109 for discussion
of Tyler Pipe.
72. See supra note 1.
73. 467 U.S. 638 (1984). For a discussion of Armco see infra text following
note 78.
74. See infra text following notes 107 and 119.
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D. The Multiple Tax Doctrine and Internal Consistency
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board5 held that the
taxpayer, a corporation doing business in California, and certain foreign
subsidiaries were engaged in a unitary business, and that California was
entitled to tax a fair portion of income derived from the unitary business.
The Court stated:
Having determined that a certain set of activities constitute a "unitary
business," a State must then apply a formula apportioning the income of
that business within and without the State. Such an apportionment formula
must, under both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, be fair. The
first, and again obvious, component of fairness in an apportionment
formula is what might be called internal consistency-that is, the formula
must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would result in no
more than all of the unitary business' income being taxed. 76
This was the first case in which the Court described the fair appor-
tionment prong of the Complete Auto test as requiring internal consistency.
Since California apportioned income according to a three-factor formula
based on payroll, property, and sales, this dicta concerning internal con-
sistency was innocuous. The requirement that no more than all the income
be taxed if all states used the same formula was automatically met; if all
states used a formula identical to California's, exactly 100% of total income
(or any other base) would be taxed. An apportionment formula based on
sales or any other single factor automatically meets the internal consistency
test as well. 77 The internal consistency qualification took on greater prom-
75. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
76. Id. at 172-73.
77. It is when different states use different formulas that problems of actual
potential multiple taxation arise. See supra notes 68-69, and accompanying text.
These problems are assumed away under the internal consistency test since all states
are assumed to use the same apportionment formula, and Moorman Mfg. Co. v.
Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), held that they are to be resolved by Congress, not by
the courts.
Recently, some states have altered their allocation formulas to give extra weight
to the sales factor. For example, North Carolina moved from a three factor formula
based on property, payroll and sales with each factor given equal weight, to a
three factor formula with sales given twice as much weight as the other two factors.
Such a weighted formula is more favorable to local industry than an unweighted
formula because it reduces the share of its total income allocated to the home
state. For example, assume a North Carolina corporation has all of its property
and payroll in North Carolina and its sales evenly divided between North Carolina
and Virginia. Assuming both states used an unweighted three factor formula 83.33%
(100% + 100% + 50% = 250% -- 3 = 83.33%) of the corporation's income would
be apportioned to North Carolina, and 16.67% (0% = 0% + 50% =
50% + 3 = 16.67%) would be apportioned to Virginia. If both state used the
new weighted formula adopted by North Carolina (100% + 100% + 50% +
50% = 300% - 4 = 75%) would be allocated to North Carolina, and 25%
1989]
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inence, however, in Armco Inc. v. Hardesty,8 where the Court applied it
for a purpose other than determining the fairness of formulary appor-
tionment.
III. ARMco
Armco involved West Virginia's tax on gross receipts. The tax, applied
at the rate of .88% to gross receipts, derived from the sale of goods
manufactured within West Virginia, whether sold within or without the
State. This facet of the tax was labeled a manufacturing tax. Gross receipts,
derived from the sale within West Virginia of goods manufactured elsewhere,
were taxed at a .27% rate. This facet of the tax was labeled a wholesaling
tax. The Court held the wholesaling tax was unconstitutional for two
reasons, one sound and one unsound.
First, the Court noted that the wholesaling tax was facially discrimi-
natory since it applied only to goods manufactured outside the state. Facial
discrimination does not automatically render a tax invalid.79 The discrim-
(0% + 0% + 50% + 50% = 100% - 4 = 25%) to Virginia. Taxes payable
to the home state are reduced by adopting the weighted formula. Taxes payable
to other states which have made a similar change will be increased. Of course,
each state making the change will hope that other states will be slow to follow
suit. So long as they are, the decrease in local taxes will not be offset by an
increase in taxes paid to other states and the change provides an incentive for
industry to locate within the state. Justice Powell's dissent in Moorman probably
would have barred this kind of competition among the states. See supra note 69
and accompanying text. The first state to move to a weighted formula would have
created a risk of multiple taxation violative of the commerce clause. For example,
if only North Carolina used the weighted three factor formula while all other states
used an unweighted three factor formula, a Virginia corporation with all its property
and payroll in Virginia and its sales evenly divided between Virginia and North
Carolina would have 83.33% (100% + 100% + 50% = 250% + 3 = 83.33%)
of its income apportioned to Virginia and 25% (0% + 0% + 50% + 50% =
100% + 4 = 25%) to North Carolina. Thus, it would be taxed on 108% of its
income.
78. 467 U.S. 638 (1984).
79. A tax may be discriminatory on its face yet nondiscriminatory in op-
eration. For example, a state may impose a use tax upon goods purchased outside
the state for use within the state. Although such a tax applies only to goods
purchased outside the state, it will be upheld if it merely compensates for a sales
tax applicable to goods purchased and used within the state since "the purpose
of such a sales-use tax scheme is to make all tangible property used or consumed
in the State subject to a uniform tax burden irrespective of whether it is acquired
within the State making it subject to the sales tax, or from without the State,
making it subject to a use tax at the same rate." Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 66 (1963). In Halliburton Oil the use tax in question
imposed a heavier burden on certain transactions than did the sales tax. Although
the inequality "may have been an accident of statutory drafting," the Court held
the use tax unconstitutional. Id. at 72. It thus made clear that the effect as well
as the purpose of the facially discriminatory tax must be equality of treatment
under the laws of the taxing state.
[Vol. 54
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ination here, however, was not cured by the manufacturing tax because
"manufacturing and wholesaling are not 'substantially equivalent events'
such that the heavy tax on in-state manufacturers can be said to compensate
for the admittedly lighter burden placed on wholesalers from out of State."80
Although manufacturing and wholesaling are different events, this ob-
servation sheds no light on the practical economic effect of the taxes. In
both instances, the tax was measured by gross receipts, and the state's
apparent purpose was to tax all gross receipts having a substantial connection
with the state, through either manufacturing or selling activities conducted
within the state. Neither the state nor the taxpayer had much interest in
the label attached to the tax or its formal subject matter. Gross receipts
measured the tax, and the taxing provision should have been viewed as
imposing a single tax (rather than two separate taxes) on all gross receipts
connected with the state."' Alternatively, the two taxes could have been
viewed as compensatory taxes. Either way the discrimination against in-
terstate commerce was nonexistent because gross receipts realized by in-
state manufacturers were taxed more heavily than those of out-of-state
manufacturers, and the commerce clause is not concerned with discrimi-
nation against local interests,2 -since such discrimination cannot burden
interstate commerce.8 3
80. Armco, 467 U.S. at 643.
81. Prior to Complete Auto a tax on gross receipts derived from the interstate
sale of goods manufactured within the state would have been viewed as a direct
tax on interstate commerce and invalid under the tax immunity doctrine. See Freeman
v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946). A tax "on manufacturing" measured by total
gross receipts derived from interstate sales was viewed as an indirect tax on interstate
commerce and therefore permissible under the immunity doctrine. American Mfg.
Co. v. City of St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919). For similar reasons a tax "on
wholesaling" measured by total gross receipts derived from interstate sales to
customers within the taxing state was allowed. See General Motors Corp. v.
Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964). This analysis under the tax immunity rule led
to the entirely artificial notion that neither a manufacturing tax measured by
unapportioned gross receipts nor a wholesaling tax measured by unapportioned
gross receipts presented a multiple tax issue. The former was a tax on manufacturing
and no other state could tax the manufacturing. The latter was a tax on wholesaling
and no other state could tax the wholesaling. If formal distinctions are to be
abandoned after Complete Auto, the "manufacturing" and "wholesaling" tax labels
ought to be abandoned and the taxes recognized for what they are-taxes on gross
receipts.
As an alternative to characterizing the taxes according to their measure, the
manufacturing and wholesaling taxes could have been viewed as compensating taxes.
Compensating taxes, such as sales and use taxes, are analyzed as a unity or as a
single tax. The Court considered and rejected characterizing the taxes in Armco
as compensating taxes, since they were not on "substantially equivalent event[s]."
Armco, 467 U.S. at 643 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 759 (1981)).
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The Court relied on only Maryland v. Louisiana4 for the proposition
that the manufacturing tax and wholesaling tax should be evaluated sep-
arately. This case is distinguishable since it involved real rather than imag-
ined discrimination. Louisiana, like many states, has severance taxes which
apply to the extraction of natural resources. In the case of natural gas,
Louisiana's severance tax applied at the rate of seven cents per thousand
cubic feet.85 The tax did not apply to gas extracted from the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) through offshore drilling, although most of the
OCS gas was piped to refining plants in Louisiana before being sold to
consumers in interstate commerce. It was estimated that 90%/o of the OCS
gas processed in Louisiana was sold to out-of-state consumers.86
Louisiana adopted a "first-use" tax applicable to any gas entering
Louisiana that had not been previously taxed by a state or the United
States. The first use tax applied at a rate exactly equal to the Louisiana
severance tax of seven cents per thousand cubic feet. Since most states,
like Louisiana, impose a severance tax, the first use tax essentially applied
to only OCS gas. If Louisiana's tax statute had stopped at that point,
nothing in the Court's opinion intimates a constitutional problem would
have existed. Louisiana's first use and severance taxes would have taxed
all gas connected with the State in an evenhanded fashion, just as West
Virginia's manufacturing and wholesaling taxes treated all gross receipts
connected with the State in an evenhanded fashion.87
Louisiana went further. It effectively exempted, from the first use tax,
any OCS gas sold within the state.88 The result was an obvious preference
for in-state users of OCS gas since neither the severance tax nor the first
use tax applied. This preference, the Court concluded, could not be justified
on grounds that the first use and severance taxes were compensatory taxes
82. See Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1958)(Brennan, J., concurring).
83. Id.
84. 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
85. Id. at 731.
86. Id. at 729.
87. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. As the discussion indicates,
the West Virginia tax held unconstitutional was not only evenhanded, it treated
out-of-state sellers more generously than in-state sellers. In effect, the Court's
holding turned the discrimination doctrine on its head by condemning a tax which
discriminated in favor of interstate commerce. Cf. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc., v.
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring) (state discrimination in favor
of interstate commerce is constitutional).
88. After reviewing a system of exemptions and credits relating to the first
use tax, the Court concluded: "OCS gas may generally be consumed in Louisiana
without the burden of the First-Use Tax. Its principal application is to gas moving
out of the State." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 759. Since OC gas was
not extracted within the state, it was also free of the severance tax.
[Vol. 54
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because "the common thread running through the cases upholding com-
pensatory taxes is the equality of treatment between local and interstate
commerce." 8 9 Since equality of treatment was plainly lacking in the Louis-
iana scheme, the first use tax was held discriminatory. The Court stated:
The two events (use and severance) are not comparable in the same fashion
as a use tax complements a sales tax. In that case, a state is attempting
to impose a tax on a substantially equivalent event to assure uniform
treatment of goods and materials to be consumed in the state. No such
equality exists in this instance.9
Contrary to the suggestion of Armco, Maryland v. Louisiana did not
blithely assume the first use and severance taxes to be noncompensatory
because use and severance are not substantially equivalent events in a
physical sense. Instead, they were held noncompensatory because the sev-
erance tax in no way compensated for the inequality of treatment inherent
in the first use tax which applied only to OCS gas sold out-of-state.
Inequality of treatment was the critical determinant. In Armco, unlike
Maryland v. Louisiana, the only inequality which existed favored the out-
of-state seller. 9' Either the manufacturing tax and the wholesaling tax should
have been characterized as a single tax on gross receipts with a higher rate
applicable to in-state than out-of-state sellers, or the two taxes should have
been regarded as compensatory since the manufacturing tax cured (com-
pensated for) the facial discrimination of the wholesaling tax.
Viewed alone, that is, without regard to the taxing power of other
states, the Armco West Virginia tax on gross receipts treated interstate
commerce more generously than intrastate commerce and was nondiscrim-
inatory in the commerce clause sense. The best evidence of this is seen in
that, as in the Railway Express cases, 92 the taxing provision could be
reformulated and the discrimination cured through a mere change in words.
If the wholesaling tax applied, at the rate of .27%, to gross receipts derived
from the sale of goods manufactured or sold within the state there would
be no discrimination since the wholesaling tax would apply equally to in-
state and out-of-state sellers. 93 If the manufacturing tax applied at the rate
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. In commenting on the "substantially equivalent events" test as applied
in Armco, Professor Hartman has said the phrase "appears to be something of
an accordion term that can be expanded or contracted as the Court thinks the
situation warrants." P. HARTmAN, FEDERAL LITIA'rONS ON STATE AND LOCAL
TAXATION 40-41 (Supp. 1987).
92. See supra text accompanying note 23, for a discussion of the Railway
Express cases.
93. The state of the manufacturer may impose a manufacturing tax measured
by gross receipts regardless of where the goods are sold. See Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981). The market state may impose a wholesaling
tax measured by gross receipts realized by an out-of-state seller if the seller is
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of .61% to gross receipts derived from the sale (within or without the
state) of goods manufactured within the state, the tax burden would be
identical to that held unconstitutional in Armco, but no discrimination
against interstate commerce would exist. 4 The problem with this branch
of the Armco decision was that the Court elevated form over substance
just as it did in the Railway Express cases. The "manufacturing tax"
versus "wholesaling tax" label was deemed critical. 9"
Nonetheless, Armco was correctly decided because the second rationale
that provided for its holding was sound, although rather clumsily applied.
Perhaps sensing that its analysis of the relationship between the manu-
facturing and wholesaling taxes was less than satisfying, the Court went
on to observe that
when the two taxes are considered together, discrimination against interstate
commerce persists. If Ohio or any of the other 48 states imposes a like
tax on its manufacturers-which they have every right to do-then Armco
and others frbm out of State will pay both a manufacturing tax and a
wholesale tax while sellers resident in West Virginia will pay only the
manufacturing tax.6
We have already seen that in his Moorman dissent Justice Powell
merged the multiple tax doctrine into the discrimination doctrine., In Armco
he did exactly the same thing, this time writing for the majority. The
constitutional impediment to the West Virginia tax was genuine. An out-
of-state manufacturer selling in West Virginia was potentially subject to
two taxes on gross receipts, whereas an intrastate seller was not. Until
Armco, however, the multiple tax problem resulting from the interplay of
taxes which might be adopted by two or more states was viewed as an
apportionment problem, not a discrimination problem. In characterizing
the risk of multiple taxation as discrimination, Justice Powell invoked the
internal consistency notion of Container Corp. rather than rely on his
present within the market state through at least one employee, including an employee
not engaged in selling activities. Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Dep't of Revenue,
419 U.S. 560 (1975). For a critique of this case see Shores, supra note 11, at 148-
50.
94. In-state manufacturers would pay taxes equal to .88% (.27% + .610/6)
of total gross receipts. Out-of-state manufacturers would pay a tax equal to .27%
of gross receipts derived from West Virginia. The tax burden would be identical
to that involved in Armco. The proposed tax would be politically unpopular because
in-state manufacturers would be subject to two taxes measured by gross receipts,
the manufacturing tax and the wholesaling tax. Practical people would view this
as double taxation. Under the Court's analysis it would not be double taxation
because the manufacturing tax and wholesaling tax were held as two distinct taxes.
95. As Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, pointed out, "The Court's analysis ...
employs a formalism I thought we had generally abandoned in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady .... " Armco, 467 U.S. at 648.
96. Id. at 644.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
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dissent in Moorman'8 Recognizing that the Court in Container Corp. said
that an apportionment formula (not a tax) must be internally consistent
to meet the fair apportionment requirement (not the discrimination re-
quirement), Justice Powell concluded that, "[a] similar rule applies where
the allegation is that a tax on its face discriminates against interstate
commerce. A tax that unfairly apportions income from other States is a
form of discrimination against interstate commerce." 99
Thus, in a few short lines, drawing what support he could from dicta
in Container Corp. concerning fair apportionment, Justice Powell created
a new rule of internal consistency for determining when a tax is discrim-
inatory. Under this rule, apparently intended to apply only to facially
discriminatory taxes, °° a tax discriminates in violation of the commerce
clause if it lacks internal consistency as that term was used in Container
Corp.. Essentially, then, the tax is discriminatory if its application by other
states would result in multiple taxation. This is the first case in which the
Court looked to the laws (or possible future laws) of two or more states
and held a tax discriminatory because it created a risk of multiple taxation.
Under this branch of the Armco decision, equal treatment of interstate
and intrastate business subject to the laws of the taxing state was not
sufficient to avoid discrimination. The Court assumed such equality of
treatment when it considered the West Virginia manufacturing tax and
wholesaling tax together. 0' Nonetheless, it concluded that the taxes were
discriminatory because of potential multiple taxation.
The Armco reasoning was sound and consistent with prior law insofar
as it recognized potential multiple taxation as an undue burden on interstate
commerce, thus violative of the commerce clause. The hazard of collapsing
98. See supra text accompanying note 75 for discussion of Container Corp.
99. Armco, 467 U.S. at 644.
100. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Conner and Scalia have taken
the position that under Armco the internal consistency test applies only to statutes
which discriminate on their face. See Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 253 (O'Conner, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia, with whom the Chief Justice joined, concurring in part,
dissenting in part, stated:
The holding of Armco thus establishes only that a facially discriminatory
taxing scheme that is not internally consistent will not be saved by the
claim that in fact no adverse impact on interstate commerce has occurred.
To expand that brief discussion into a holding that internal consistency
is always required, and thereby to revolutionize the law of state taxation,
is indeed remarkable.
Id. at 257.
This reading of Armco is supported by the language from the Armco opinion
quoted above. See supra text accompanying note 99. However, the majority opinion
in Tyler Pipe did not explicitly state that the internal consistency test applies only
to facially discriminatory taxes, and its scope is unclear. See infra text accompanying
notes 149-54.
101. See supra text accompanying note 96, and note 100.
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the multiple tax doctrine into the discrimination doctrine, however, was
revealed by Justice Powell's dicta concerning hypothetical taxes imposed
by West Virginia and Ohio. If Ohio imposed a facially neutral tax only
upon manufacturing and West Virginia only upon wholesaling with both
taxes measured by gross receipts, Justice Powell hypothesized, exactly the
same multiple tax problem that proved fatal to the actual West Virginia
tax would arise. Since both Ohio's manufacturing tax and West Virginia's
wholesaling tax would be measured by unapportioned gross receipts, local
business selling in West Virginia would be taxed once on gross receipts,
while an Ohio business selling in West Virginia would be taxed twice. Yet,
in this context, multiple taxation is benign, said Justice Powell, because
"such a result would not arise from impermissible discrimination against
interstate commerce but from fair encouragement of in-state business."'0
The Court never explained why the risk of multiple taxation provides
sufficient reason to condemn a facially discriminatory statute but not a
facially neutral statute, nor was the risk explained by the "impermissible
discrimination" versus "fair encouragement" dichotomy. 03 Perhaps facial
discrimination served to put the statute in a disfavored category and caused
a generally tolerable burden to become intolerable. But, this explanation
makes no sense for two reasons. First, the facial discrimination could have
been cured by a mere change in the words of the taxing statute. 104 It was,
therefore, unpersuasive to attach constitutional significance to facial dis-
crimination. Second, the practical economic effects should have governed
and they were the same under the facially neutral statute as under the
facially discriminatory statute. The burden was in the form of multiple
taxation of interstate business, and it was unaffected by the terms of the
taxing statute.
The proper application of the multiple tax doctrine in the context
hypothetically addressed by Justice Powell was clearly set forth in Adams
Manufacturing Co. v. Storen,105 which held Indiana could not tax all gross
receipts derived from the sale in other states of goods manufactured in
Indiana. The Court in Adams, recently cited with approval in Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,1°6 said:
The vice of the statute as applied to receipts from interstate sales is that
the tax includes in its measure, without apportionment, receipts derived
from activities in interstate commerce; and that the exaction is of such a
character that if lawful it may in substance be laid to fullest extent by
102. Armco, 467 U.S. at 645.
103. As Professor Hartman has said, "The line between a stick and an
alluring, succulent carrot as a means of getting business to locate in the taxing
State may not always be completely clear. The same statute may contain elements
of both." P. HARInmi,, supra note 91, at 47.
104. See supra text accompanying note 92.
105. 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
106. 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979).
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States in which the goods are sold as well as those in which they are
manufactured. 107
The hypothetical taxes approved by Justice Powell should be invalid
for the same reason. If an Ohio manufacturer, selling in West Virginia,
must pay a manufacturing tax to Ohio and a wholesaling tax to West
Virginia, and both taxes are measured by the same gross receipts, the
practical effect is multiple taxation of gross receipts no matter what labels
are attached to the taxes. Justice Powell's failure to treat multiple taxation
consistently, regardless of whether it results from a facially discriminatory
or facially neutral statute, probably stemmed from his unwillingness to
view multiple taxation and discrimination as separate problems. Combining
them confuses the analysis and contributes to the false notion that the risk
of multiple taxation created by a facially discriminatory statute imposes a
greater burden on interstate commerce than the burden created by a facially
neutral statute.
The Armco Court reached the right result in striking down the West
Virginia tax out of concern for multiple taxation, although its reliance on
the discrimination doctrine was misplaced. Fortunately, the Court's dis-
cussion of the multiple tax problem created by a neutral statute taxing all
gross receipts derived from interstate sales was dicta. One could hope that
before the situation discussed hypothetically in Armco reached the Court,
it would reconsider the wisdom of hinging the constitutionality of multiple
taxation on the existence of facial discrimination which in no way affected
the burden on interstate commerce created by multiple taxation. Especially
when, on the facts of Armco, the unconstitutionality could be cured by
merely revising the language of the statute. As the Court said in Complete
Auto: "The reason for attaching constitutional significance to a semantic
difference is difficult to discern."' 0 8
IV. TYLER PnE
Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Department of Rev-
enue,109 illustrates that this hope was misplaced. Tyler Pipe had much in
common with Armco. It involved a tax imposed by the state of Washington
equal to .44% of gross receipts derived from either manufacturing or
wholesaling within the state.110 If a business engaged in both activities the
statute provided an exemption from the manufacturing tax."' The multiple
activities exemption meant that gross receipts connected with business ac-
tivities transacted vithin the state were taxed once, whether those activities
107. Adams Mfg. Co., 304 U.S. at 311.
108. Complete Auto, 480 U.S. at 285.
109. 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
110. Id. at 237.
111. Id. at 236-37.
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consisted of manufacturing, selling or both. The exemption, then, meant
the manufacturing tax only applied to in-state manufacturers who sold
outside the state. Just as the West Virginia wholesaling tax in Armco was
held invalid because it applied to only out-of-state manufacturers selling
in West Virginia, the Washington manufacturing tax was held invalid
because it applied to only in-state manufacturers who sold outside the state
but not to in-state manufacturers who sold within the state.' 2 Unlike Armco,
Tyler Pipe also involved a challenge to the nondiscriminatory wholesaling
tax on the ground that gross receipts derived from interstate transactions
were subject to tax without fair apportionment."' The discrimination and
apportionment facets of the case are separately considered below.
A. The Discrimination Issue
Since the manufacturing tax in Tyler Pipe was facially discriminatory," 4
the Court considered whether the wholesaling and manufacturing taxes
should be considered as separate taxes or as compensating taxes."' If
examined as compensating taxes the practical effect was nondiscriminatory,
since all firms doing business within the state paid a tax equal to .44%
of gross receipts connected with the state. The only difference in the tax
scheme was that both in-state manufacturers and out-of-state manufacturers
selling within the state paid a wholesaling tax, while in-state manufacturers
selling outside the state paid a manufacturing tax. Following Armco, the
Court held that the manufacturing tax and the wholesaling tax were non-
compensating taxes, therefore, each was irrelevant to an evaluation of the
other." 6 Since the manufacturing tax applied only to in-state manufacturers
112. Id. at 234 ("We conclude that our reasons for invalidating the West
Virginia tax in Armco also apply to the Washington tax challenged here.")
113. Id. at 251. A third issue, not discussed in this article, was whether the
business activities of Tyler Pipe had a sufficient nexus with the state of Washington
to justify the gross receipts tax. Id. Under Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207
(1960), the nexus requirement was quite clearly satisfied by Tyler Pipe's business
activities within the state, and the Court so held. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 251.
114. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 240 ("This statutory exemption for manufacturers
that sell their products within the State has the same facially discriminatory con-
sequences as the West Virginia exemption we invalidated in Armco."). The state
of Washington tried to distinguish Armco on the ground that its manufacturing
tax which applied only to goods manufactured within the state and sold outside
the state was in some way different from West Virginia's wholesaling tax which
applied only to goods manufactured outside the state and sold within the state.
Relying on Justice Goldberg's dissenting opinion in General Motors Corp. v.
Washington, 377 U.S. -436, 459 (1964), the Court rejected this argument and, to
the extent its holding was inconsistent with the ruling in General Motors, that case
was overruled. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 241, 248.
115. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 242.
116. Id. at 244.
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selling in interstate commerce, the discrimination was substantive as well
as facial and thus fatal under the commerce clause. 117
As in Armco, the Tyler Pipe Court relied on Maryland v. Louisiana
in holding that manufacturing and wholesaling were not "substantially
equivalent events,""' therefore, neither tax could be taken into account in
evaluating the constitutionality of the other. For the reasons discussed
above in connection with Armco," 9 the Court's reliance on Maryland v.
Louisiana was misplaced. In that case, intrastate transactions were accorded
preferential treatment under Louisiana law since they alone were exempt
from both Louisiana's severance tax and its first use tax. The taxes were
therefore properly viewed as noncompensating. Because Washington law
accorded equal treatment to all taxpayers conducting business within the
state, the Court should have viewed its manufacturing and wholesaling
taxes as compensating taxes. 20
Despite its reliance on Maryland v. Louisiana, the Court's analysis in
Tyler Pipe was significantly different from that in Armco. Armco found
a commerce clause violation for two independent reasons: 1) the West
Virginia wholesaling tax was discriminatory in that it applied only to out-
of-state sellers, and the unequal treatment under the wholesaling tax was
not compensated for by the manufacturing tax because the wholesaling tax
and the manufacturing tax were not taxes on substantially equivalent events;
and 2) even if unequal treatment under West Virginia law was cured by
viewing the wholesaling tax and manufacturing tax as compensating taxes,
discrimination persisted because of the risk that interstate transactions alone
might be subject to multiple taxation.' 2' Initially, the Tyler Pipe opinion
appeared to take the same approach;122 however, in the end it abandoned
the first reason.
117. Id. at 240. The taxes were held noncompensatory because they created
a risk of multiple taxation which applied to interstate transactions, but not to
intrastate transactions. Once the manufacturing tax was severed from the wholesaling
tax, the discriminatory effect was obvious. Absent a compensating tax applicable
to goods manufactured and sold within the state, no plausible argument could be
made in support of a manufacturing tax applicable only to goods sold outside the
state. See infra text accompanying note 124.
118. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 244.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 84-91.
120. As explained above, under a more straightforward analysis leading to
the same result, the Washington statute could have been viewed as imposing a
single tax on all gross receipts connected with the state. The discrimination would
then disappear since all firms doing business within the state would be subject to
a single uniform tax on gross receipts connected with the state. See supra note
81.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 84-99.
122. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 243.
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The only reason the taxes were noncompensating and therefore dis-
criminatory, according to the Tyler Pipe Court,2 3 was that an out-of-state
manufacturer selling in Washington might be required to pay a manufac-
turing tax to another state, and a wholesaling tax to Washington; while
an in-state manufacturer selling in Washington would pay only the whole-
saling tax. Expansion of the multiple activities exemption to include out-
of-state manufacturers who paid manufacturing taxes to another state
eliminates the risk of multiple taxation, and, in the words of the Court,
would "cure the discrimination."''2 Assume, for example, that Production
Corporation manufactured goods in California and sold them in Wash-
ington. If California imposed a manufacturing tax measured by total gross
receipts, the gross receipts would have been taxed twice, once by California
and once by Washington. However, if Production Corporation moved its
manufacturing activities into Washington the multiple activities exemption
would have resulted in a single tax on gross receipts, and it was this
preference for local transactions which the Court held improper. Preferential
treatment for intrastate commerce would be eliminated if the multiple
activities exemption was expanded to apply whenever both manufacturing
and wholesaling were taxed by any state. Washington's wholesaling tax
would then apply only in the absence of a manufacturing tax levied by
any state. If California adopted such a manufacturing tax, Production
Corporation would pay a single tax on sales in Washington, regardless of
whether manufacturing occurred in California or Washington. Since Wash-
ington's manufacturing and wholesaling taxes would then create no risk
of multiple taxation, they would be viewed as compensating taxes. The
wholesaling tax, applicable to in-state manufacturers selling within the state,
would then compensate for the facial discrimination of the Washington
manufacturing tax applicable only to in-state manufacturers selling outside
the state. The Armco notion that a manufacturing tax and a wholesaling
tax could not be compensating taxes, even in the absence of a risk of
123. The Court stated:
We ... reject the ... contention that the State's imposition of a man-
ufacturing tax on local goods sold outside the state should be saved as
a valid "compensating tax".. .. The only burden for which the man-
ufacturing tax exemption is arguably compensatory is the State's imposition
of a wholesale tax on local sales of local manufacturers; absent the
exemption, a local manufacturer might be at an economic disadvantage
because it would pay both a manufacturing and a wholesale tax, while a
manufacturer from afar would pay only the wholesale tax. The State's
justification for thus taxing the manufacture of goods in interstate com-
merce, however, fails under our precedents. The local sales of out-of-state
manufacturers are also subject to Washington's wholesale tax, but the
multiple activities exemption does not extend its ostensible compensatory
benefit to those manufacturers.
Id. at 242-43.
124. Id. at 249.
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multiple taxation, because wholesaling and manufacturing were not sub-
stantially equivalent events in a physical sense, was implicitly abandoned.' 21
This revision of the Armco analysis was engendered by the Court's
consideration of its earlier decision in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,'Z
involving the constitutionality of a compensating use tax adopted by the
state of Washington. All states that impose a tax on retail sales face the
problem of residents avoiding the tax by purchasing goods in another state
which has no sales tax, or a lower sales tax. The compensating use tax
provides a solution to the problem. It applies (at the same rate as the
sales tax) to goods purchased outside the state and used within the state. 27
Like Washington's manufacturing tax involved in Tyler Pipe, the use tax
challenged in Henneford was facially discriminatory because it actually
applied to only transactions which crossed a state line. 21 Its practical effect
however, was not discrimination but evenhandedness. It put individuals
who purchased goods outside the state for use within the state on the
same tax footing as persons who purchased and used within the state. The
only difference was that the former paid a use tax and the latter paid a
sales tax. As Justice Cardozo explained in upholding the use tax in Henne-
ford:
125. Some language in the Court's opinion seems to follow the Armco notion
that a manufacturing tax and a wholesaling tax can never be compensating taxes
because manufacturing and wholesaling are not substantially equivalent events in
a physical sense. See Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 244. The Court's statement that
eliminating the risk of multiple taxation would cure the discrimination makes clear,
however, that the mere fact manufacturing and wholesaling are different events in
a physical sense did not provide an independent basis for holding the taxes non-
compensating. Id. at 249. The Court apparently reasoned as follows: Since the
manufacturing-wholesaling taxes created a risk of multiple taxation for interstate
transactions but not for intrastate transactions, the two taxes were not on sub-
stantially equivalent events. Since they were not on substantially equivalent events
they were not compensating taxes, and the facial discrimination of the manufacturing
tax on interstate transactions was not compensated for by the wholesaling tax on
intrastate transactions. Therefore, the manufacturing tax was discriminatory in
operation as well as form and was unconstitutional.
The important point is that the substantially equivalent events test as applied
in Tyler Pipe was meaningless. Satisfaction of the test was entirely dependent upon
whether the taxes created a risk of multiple taxation, which was the real concern.
See id. at 249 ("Either repeal of the manufacturing tax or an expansion of the
multiple activities exemption to provide out-of-state manufacturers with a credit
for manufacturing taxes paid to other states would presumably cure the discrim-
ination.").
126. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
127. The Washington use tax involved in Henneford (like use taxes adopted
by most states), theoretically applied to all goods used within the state. However,
any sales tax paid was allowed as a credit against the use tax. Since all goods
purchased in Washington were subject to the sales tax, the use tax could apply
only with respect to goods purchased outside the state and used within -the state.
128. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
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When the account is made up, the stranger from afar is subject to no
greater burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within
the gates. The one pays upon one activity or incident, and the other upon
another, but the sum is the same when the reckoning is closed. Equality
exists when the chattel subjected to the use tax is bought in another state
and then carried into Washington. It exists when the imported chattel is
shipped from the state of origin under an order received directly from
the state of destination. In each situation the burden borne by the owner
is balanced by an equal burden where the sale is strictly local .... If the
sales tax were abolished, the buyer in Washington would pay at once
upon the use. He would have no longer an offsetting credit. While the
sales tax is in force, he pays upon the sale, and pays at the same rate.
For the owner who uses after buying from afar the effect is all one
whether his competitor is taxable under one title or another.,"
Since the Court found that intrastate and interstate transactions were
treated equally under the sales-use tax scheme when viewed as a whole,
the use tax was characterized as a compensating tax and there was no
discrimination for commerce clause purposes.
The question in Tyler Pipe, as in the sales-use tax context, was whether
interstate transactions were subjected to a burden not imposed on intrastate
transactions. In the sales-use tax context, no such burden was found because
the consumer paid exactly the same Washington tax whether goods were
both purchased and used within the state, or were purchased elsewhere
and used within the state. By a parity of reasoning, Washington's man-
ufacturing-wholesaling tax imposed no special burden on interstate com-
merce. The tax was the same whether goods were manufactured and sold
within the state, manufactured within the state and sold elsewhere, or
manufactured elsewhere and sold within the state.
To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, when the account was made up, the
Washington manufacturer who sold to a stranger from afar was subject
to no greater burdens as a consequence of manufacture and sale than one
who sold to a dweller within the gates. The one paid upon one activity
or incident, and the other upon another, but the sum was the same when
the reckoning was closed. If the wholesaling tax were abolished, the Wash-
ington manufacturer selling within the state pays at once upon the man-
ufacture, since he no longer qualifies for a multiple activities exemption. 130
As long as the wholesaling tax is in force, he pays upon the wholesaling,
and pays at the same rate. Nonetheless, the Court distinguished Henneford,
observing:
We upheld the [use] tax because, in the context of the overall tax structure,
the burden it placed on goods purchased out of state was identical to that
placed on an equivalent purchase within the State. This identical impact
was no fortuity; it was guaranteed by the statutory exemption from the
129. Id. at 584.
130. The multiple activities exemption from the manufacturing tax applied
only if the wholesaling tax applied. WAsH. REv. CODE § 82.04.440 (1985).
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use tax for the goods on which a sales tax had already been paid, regardless
of whether the sales tax had been paid to Washington or to another
State. .... M
The parallel condition precedent for a valid multiple activities ex-
emption eliminating exposure to the burden of a multiple tax on manu-
facturing and wholesaling would provide a credit against Washington tax
liability for wholesale taxes paid by local manufacturers to any State, not
just Washington. The multiple activities exemption only operates to impose
a unified tax eliminating the risk of multiple taxation when the acts of
manufacturing and wholesaling are both carried out within the State. The
exemption excludes similarly situated manufacturers and wholesalers which
conduct one of those activities within Washington and the other activity
outside the State. Washington's ... tax scheme is therefore inconsistent
with our precedents13Z
Thus, the critical distinction between Tyler Pipe and Henneford was
that Washington's manufacturing tax, involved in Tyler Pipe, was reduced
only for a wholesaling tax paid to Washington, whereas its use tax, involved
in Henneford, was reduced for a sales tax paid to Washington or any
other state. Contrary to the Court's assertion, until Tyler Pipe, a reduction
in the use tax for a sales tax paid to another state was not viewed as
constitutionally mandated.' The reason was twofold. First, a sales tax
paid to another state presented no discrimination problem because until
Armco the Court had looked only to the laws of the taxing state in
131. The Court erred in its interpretation of Henneford. In Henneford, Justice
Cardozo said:
Yet a word of caution should be added here to avoid the chance of
misconception. We have not meant to imply by anything said in this
opinion that allowance of a credit for other taxes paid to Washington
made it mandatory that there should be a like allowance for taxes paid
to other states. A state, for many purposes, is to be reckoned as a self-
contained unit, which may frame its own system of burdens and exemptions
without heeding systems elsewhere. If there are limits to that power, there
is no need to mark them now.
Henneford, 300 U.S. at 587. Contrary to the assertion of the Court in Tyler Pipe,
the identical impact of Washington's sales-use tax upon interstate and intrastate
transactions was indeed a fortuity, and was in no sense mandated by Henneford.
132. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 245 (citation omitted).
133. See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 77 (1963)
("[A] state may not be constitutionally obliged to credit the amount of sales taxes
paid in other States against the use tax it imposes.") (Brennan, J., concurring);
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 21-22 (1985).
This Court has expressly reserved the question whether a State must credit
a sales tax paid to another State against its own use tax. The District of
Columbia and all but three states with sales and use taxes do provide
such a credit, although reciprocity may be required. . . Appellants urge
us to hold that it [a credit against the use tax for sales taxes paid to
another state] is a constitutional requirement. Once again, however, we
find it unnecessary to reach this question.
Id. at 21-22 (citations omitted). See also supra note 131.
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determining whether a tax was discriminatory. 3 4 So long as the taxing state
treated interstate and intrastate commerce equally, there was no discrim-
ination. Second, under a line of questionable authority,' s a sales tax imposed
by one state and a use tax imposed by another state did not implicate the
multiple tax doctrine, because the sales tax and the use tax were viewed
as taxes on different things, even though both taxes were measured by the
sale price of the thing sold. 3 6 Thus, if a Washington resident purchased
134. Justice Cardozo's Henneford opinion was very clear on this point. He
emphasized that Washington went beyond what the constitution required in allowing
a credit against its use tax for sales taxes paid to another state. So long as the
tax system of a given state, "reckoned as a self-contained unit," treated interstate
and intrastate transactions equally, there is no discrimination for commerce clause
purposes under the holding of Henneford. Henneford, 300 U.S. at 587.
135. See McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); General Trading
Co. v. Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
136. The notion that a tax on a sale and a tax on use were taxes on different
things was directly attributable to the tax immunity doctrine discussed above. See
supra note 40. Under that doctrine interstate transactions were immune from state
taxation. Recognizing a sales tax imposed by one state and a use tax imposed by
another state as two taxes on a single transaction would have implied the power
of each state to tax an interstate transaction. To avoid this implication the Court
held that an interstate sale is subject to a sales tax by the state of origin if the
sale is consummated there, and to a use tax by the state of destination. See supra
text accompanying note 135. One tax preceded the interstate journey; the other
followed it. Neither was on an interstate transaction. They were on different things
and thus arguably presented no multiple tax issue. This analysis was similar to
that which developed under the tax immunity doctrine with respect to manufacturing
and wholesaling taxes measured by gross receipts. See supra note 81. For a critique
of this line of authority concluding that these circumstances do present a multiple
tax problem see Shores, supra note 11, at 164-68. For a contrary view, see Nowak
and Rotunda, Sales and Use Tax Credits, Discrimination Against Interstate Com-
merce, and the Useless Multiple Tax Concept, 20 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 273 (1987),
arguing that it should be constitutional for State A to grant a credit against its
use tax for a sales tax paid to. State A while denying such a credit for a sales tax
paid to State B because the State A tax is not discriminatory "when looked at
by itself," and one could just as well claim that the burden on interstate transactions
comes from State B's tax. Id. at 281-82, 308. Since neither state can be said to
be at fault, the authors conclude that the multiple tax doctrine asks the wrong
question and should be abandoned.
This argument was implicitly rejected by Tyler Pipe. See infra text accompanying
note 137. It is a flawed argument in that it assumes a tax should be unconstitutional
under the multiple tax doctrine only if it can be shown that one state has caused
the undue burden. The multiple tax doctrine, of course, rejects this premise. It
holds that State A may not apply an unapportioned tax to an interstate transaction
if other states have power to tax the same transaction. The question of whether
State A or some other state is at fault for the burden which would result if both
states taxed without apportionment is simply irrelevant. Conceivably, the multiple
tax doctrine represents bad policy, but Nowak and Rotunda do not tell us why
this is so. They simply state the well-known fact that constitutionality under the
multiple tax doctrine does not turn on fault and conclude automatically that is a
bad thing. For an argument that comes to grips with the issue of whether it is
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a widget in California and paid a sales tax to California, Washington could
impose its use tax when the widget was brought into Washington without
raising a multiple tax issue. The tax on the sale was viewed as separate
from the tax on use.
The Tyler Pipe Court's implicit rejection of this line of authority was
sound, and it now seems clear that under Henneford, as reinterpreted by
Tyler Pipe, a use tax applicable to goods purchased outside the state for
use within the state will be constitutional only if it is reduced for any
sales tax paid to another state.13 7 Evenhanded treatment in the sense that
goods purchased within the state are subject to a sales tax equal to the
use tax applicable to goods purchased outside the state will not suffice.
To pass the discrimination test of Tyler Pipe, it must further be shown
that the use tax creates no risk of multiple taxation by application to
goods already subjected to another state's sales tax.
Similarly, evenhanded treatment in the sense that goods manufactured
within and sold without the state are subject to a manufacturing tax equal
to a wholesaling tax applied to goods sold within the state (regardless of
where manufactured) will not suffice. It must further be shown that the
manufacturing tax creates no risk of multiple taxation by application to
goods subject to another state's wholesaling tax.
Since the discrimination found in Tyler Pipe flowed from the risk of
multiple taxation, it could have been cured by eliminating that risk.'38 The
Court jettisoned the erroneous Armco notion that failure to meet a "sub-
stantially equivalent events" test provides an independent reason for holding
the manufacturing and'wholesaling taxes noncompensatory and, therefore,
bad, and concludes that it is, see Justice Black's dissenting opinion in J.D. Adams
Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 (1937). Essentially, Justice Black
argued that the Court usurps a legislative function when it invalids a state tax
which, considered alone, treats interstate and intrastate commerce equally.
137. See Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?: Reflections on an
Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 MicH. L. REv. 138,
160-61 (1988). Nevada is the only state which denies a credit against its use tax
for a sales tax paid to another state. States which allow the credit may require
reciprocity. C.C.H. STATE TAx GuiDE 6013 (1987).
138. As the Court suggested, the risk of multiple taxation could be eliminated
either by: (1) allowing a credit against the manufacturing tax for a wholesaling
tax paid to any state, or (2) allowing a credit against the wholesaling tax for a
manufacturing tax paid to any state. Compare Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 245, with
Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 249. For example, if Washington had adopted the credit
provision first described, the question under the internal consistency test applied
in Tyler Pipe would have been whether multiple taxation would result if another
state adopted exactly the same tax scheme. No multiple taxation would result
because if manufacture occurred in Washington and sale occurred in another state
which imposed a wholesaling tax, Washington's manufacturing tax would be reduced
by a credit for the wholesaling tax. If manufacturing occurred in another state
and sale occurred in Washington, the other state's manufacturing tax would be
reduced by a credit for the wholesaling tax paid to Washington.
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discriminatory.3 9 Although this was a step in the right direction, the Court's
adherence to the Armco notion that the risk of multiple taxation is dis-
criminatory led ultimately to an incoherent result; the Court's holding on
the discrimination issue is incompatible with its holding on the apportion-
ment issue.
B. The Apportionment Issue
The Washington manufacturing tax was held discriminatory only because
it created a risk of multiple taxation for taxpayers manufacturing in Wash-
ington and selling elsewhere or manufacturing elsewhere and selling in
Washington, 40 but not for Washington manufacturers selling within the
state. Since constitutional infirmity rested on the risk of multiple taxation,
the Court must have viewed Washington's manufacturing tax measured by
gross receipts and another state's wholesaling tax measured by the same
gross receipts as taxes on the same thing. Otherwise, there is no multiple
tax problem since taxes plausibly can be viewed as multiple only if they
apply to the same thing.
For example, if an interstate firm pays real estate taxes to Washington
on real estate used in its Washington manufacturing business, and pays
California real estate taxes on real estate used in its California wholesaling
business, these taxes cannot be viewed as multiple. Each state or political
subdivision is taxing a different thing, since each tax is measured by a
different tax base. But, a Washington manufacturing tax and a California
wholesaling tax measured by the same gross receipts can be viewed as
multiple because they are measured by the same thing. Indeed, that is the
most persuasive view since the thing taxed is the gross receipts. Manu-
facturing activities in Washington and wholesaling activities in California
provide the due process connection which enables each state to tax gross
receipts attributable to those activities, but as a matter of economic reality,
gross receipts measure the tax and are the real subject of the tax.' If,
139. For a discussion of this facet of the Armco case see supra text following
note 78. As pointed out above, see supra note 125, under Tyler Pipe the "sub-
stantially equivalent events" test has no independent significance because it is
automatically met once it is shown that: (1) the manufacturing tax on goods sold
out of state applies at the same rate as the wholesaling tax on goods sold within
the state, and (2) there is no risk of multiple taxation created by either tax.
140. If Washington could adopt a wholesaling tax applicable to all goods
sold within the state, and a manufacturing tax applicable only to goods manufactured
within and sold without the state, other states could do likewise. Therefore, man-
ufacturers in other states selling in Washington could be subject to such a man-
ufacturing tax as well as to Washington's wholesaling tax.
141. For a contrary, but unpersuasive, argument that a tax "on manufac-
turing" measured by gross receipts is a tax on manufacturing, and a tax "on
wholesaling" measured by the same gross receipts is a tax on wholesaling, see
supra note 81. The argument is supported by past decisions which applied the now
discarded tax immunity rule.
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as the Court's holding on the discrimination issue correctly implies, Wash-
ington's manufacturing tax and another state's wholesaling tax (or Wash-
ington's wholesaling tax and another state's manufacturing tax) measured
by the same gross receipts are on the same thing, then a multiple tax
problem exists whenever any state taxes unapportioned gross receipts at-
tributable to activity conducted in more than one state.
Tyler Pipe made this argument under the apportionment prong of
Complete Auto. Since Tyler Pipe paid the Washington wholesaling tax on
products manufactured in another state and sold in Washington, it claimed
the tax was not fairly apportioned because gross receipts taxed in full by
Washington were partly attributable to manufacturing activities carried on
in another state. The gross receipts were also subject to taxation by that
state. 42 Fair apportionment solves the multiple tax problem by allowing
each state to tax only a portion of total gross receipts. Without appor-
tionment a transaction crossing a state line is subject to multiple taxation
while local business will pay a single tax. Thus, Washington's unapportioned
wholesaling tax presented precisely the same multiple tax burden that caused
the Court to characterize its manufacturing tax as discriminatory. 43 Since
the manufacturing tax imposed an undue burden on interitate commerce
because of the risk of multiple taxation one expects the wholesaling tax
to be invalid for the same reason. Yet, Tyler Pipe's apportionment argument
was summarily rejected with the following explanation:
This apportionment argument rests on the erroneous assumption that...
Washington is taxing the unitary activity of manufacturing and wholesaling.
We have already determined, however, that the manufacturing tax and
the wholesaling tax are not compensating taxes for substantially equivalent
events in invalidating the multiple activities exemption. Thus, the activity
of wholesaling-whether by an in-state or an out-of-state manufacturer-
must be viewed as a separate activity conducted wholly within Washington
that no other State has jurisdiction to tax.'"
It is, of course, true that only Washington could tax the wholesaling.
The critical question, however, was whether Washington was taxing whole-
saling, or was taxing gross receipts attributable to not only wholesaling
activities but also manufacturing activities carried on in another state. If
142. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 251.
143. To reiterate an important point, the manufacturing tax held discriminatory
because it did not apply to Washington manufacturers selling within the state (they
paid the Washington wholesaling tax); but it did apply to Washington manufacturers
selling outside the state, even if they paid a wholesaling tax to another state. Thus,
interstate, but not intrastate transactions were subject to multiple taxation. See id.
at 246-47. Washington's wholesaling tax similarly created a risk of multiple taxation
for interstate transactions because goods manufactured outside Washington also
could be subject to a manufacturing tax measured by unapportioned gross receipts;
there would be no double taxation since only the state in which the sale occurred
would tax.
144. Id. at 251.
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Washington was taxing gross receipts then it was taxing something the
manufacturing state also could tax. Instead of addressing this issue, the
Court reverted to the formalistic reasoning supposedly abandoned in Com-
plete Auto.145 It held that since each state attached a different label to its
tax, Washington's wholesaling tax was on something different than what
was being taxed by another state's manufacturing tax, even though both
taxes were measured by the same gross receipts.
In some instances, there is a nice convergence between the formal
subject matter of a tax and its measure. For example, if a tax is imposed
on income and is measured by income there is no question whether income
is being taxed. If a flat tax of, say, $500 per year were imposed on
wholesaling, it would be equally clear that the tax was on wholesaling.
There simply would be no basis for claiming the tax was on something
else. When there is a divergence between the subject matter and the measure,
any realistic analysis of what is being taxed must consider whether the
measure truly represents the subject matter, or whether it indicates something
other than the formal subject matter is being taxed.
For example, if Washington imposed an annual tax on wholesaling
equal to 1% of the fair market value of all property owned by any firm
engaged in wholesaling within Washington, it cannot be assumed this is
a tax on wholesaling within Washington that no other state can tax. Since
the tax is measured by the value of property wherever located, it should
be viewed as a property tax with a risk of multiple taxation on any out-
of-state property owned by the taxpayer. Similarly, if gross receipts measured
the tax, it should be viewed as a tax on gross receipts. Another state in
which manufacturing occurs can impose a tax measured by the same gross
receipts, therefore, it is clear that neither state is taxing exclusively man-
ufacturing or wholesaling. Each is taxing gross receipts attributable to
manufacturing and wholesaling activity which occurs in both states. If, as
Complete Auto mandated, economic realities rather than legal formalities
are to govern the analysis, the Court cannot automatically assume a statute
which imposes a tax "on wholesaling," actually imposes a tax on whole-
saling. Careful consideration must be given to its measure.
Perhaps the Court did not make an automatic assumption based on
the verbal formulation of the taxing state. It did, after all, provide a reason
for concluding that the Washington tax was on wholesaling, which no other
state could tax, although measured by gross receipts. The Court said
Washington's wholesaling tax cannot be viewed as duplicated by another
state's manufacturing tax when measured by the same gross receipts, because
for purposes of the discrimination issue the manufacturing tax and whole-
145. See supra text accompanying note 30, for discussion of Complete Auto.
See also supra note 81; HELLERSTEIN, supra note 137, at 171.
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saling tax are not compensating taxes on substantially equivalent events. 146
Thus, for purposes of the apportionment issue a tax on wholesaling must
be viewed as separate from a tax on manufacturing.
As discussed above, 47 in analyzing the discrimination issue the Court
first found that the manufacturing and wholesaling taxes created a risk of
multiple taxation for interstate transactions which did not exist for intrastate
transactions. Because of this risk of multiple taxation the Court found
that the taxes did not apply to substantially equivalent events and were
not compensating taxes. In short, for purposes of the discrimination issue,
the taxes were not compensating taxes because they created a risk of
multiple taxation. Yet, for purposes of the apportionment issue, the Court
said there was no risk of multiple taxation because it had already char-
acterized the taxes as noncompensating. Obviously, the Court cannot have
it both ways. If the taxes were noncompensating because of the risk of
multiple taxation, how can it also be true that there was no risk of multiple
taxation because the taxes were noncompensating?
There is, however, another possible explanation for the Court's apparent
contradiction in holding that the manufacturing tax and wholesaling tax
created a risk of multiple taxation for discrimination purposes, but not
for apportionment purposes. Arguably, the manufacturing tax was dis-
criminatory not merely because it was noncompensating and created a risk
of multiple taxation, but because the risk arose under a statute that was
facially discriminatory. 48 Perhaps facial discrimination doomed the man-
ufacturing tax while facial neutrality saved the wholesaling tax. Indeed, it
has been suggested that Tyler Pipe "established a predictable test" under
which a facially discriminatory tax is unconstitutional if it is not internally
consistent, that is, if its imposition by other states would result in multiple
taxation. 49 Since the Court characterized the manufacturing tax as facially
discriminatory, Tyler Pipe can be read in this way. However, only Justice
146. The language quoted above (see supra text accompanying note 144) might
be interpreted as stating a second reason; that is, that manufacturing and wholesaling
are not a unitary activity. The term "unitary activity," however, has no independent
meaning. Its meaning must be derived from the context and it is plain from the
context that manufacturing and wholesaling were held not to constitute a unitary
activity because they were not substantially equivalent events for purposes of the
discrimination analysis. Surely the Court did not use the term "unitary activity"
as synonymous with "unitary business." Under the Court's prior decisions "unitary
business" does have an independent meaning and it is clear that manufacturing
and wholesaling activities undertaken by a single firm generally constitute a unitary
business. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin, 447 U.S. 207 (1980) (exploration, production,
refining and marketing of petroleum products constitute a unitary business).
147. See supra text following note 123.
148. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 240.
149. Note, The "Internal Consistency Test" is Alive and Well: Tyler Pipe
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O'Connor was explicit on the point. She, alone, made clear that multiple
taxation of gross receipts is unconstitutional only when it arises under a
tax statute which is discriminatory on its face.'5 0
This interpretation has superficial appeal. The multiple activities ex-
emption from Washington's manufacturing tax shielded local transactions
from multiple taxation but failed to extend the same protection to interstate
transactions. A Washington manufacturer selling in Washington paid only
the wholesaling tax and could be taxed by no other state. A Washington
manufacturer selling elsewhere, or an out-of-state manufacturer selling in
Washington could be taxed twice, once by the manufacturing state and
again by the market state. Since Washington decided to treat its wholesaling
and manufacturing taxes as a unity by exempting, from the manufacturing
tax, transactions on which a Washington wholesaling tax had been paid,
the Court treated, as a unity, for commerce clause purposes, wholesaling
and manufacturing taxes imposed by any state. If Washington repealed
the exemption from the manufacturing tax for goods on which a Washington
wholesaling tax was paid, goods moving intrastate would be taxed twice.
The reasoning of Tyler Pipe suggests double taxation of goods moving
interstate would then be nondiscriminatory and permissible.
Unfortunately, as pointed out with respect to Armco,'5' limiting Tyler
Pipe to facially discriminatory statutes provides no explanation as to why
the risk of multiple taxation should be condemned when it arises under
a facially discriminatory statute, but approved when it arises under a facially
neutral statute. In either case, interstate transactions alone will be subject
to the risk of multiple taxation. This is because it is extremely unlikely
that a state would impose double taxation on goods manufactured and
sold within the state. Rather, after Tyler Pipe a state is likely to impose
either a manufacturing tax or a wholesaling tax, but not both. Double
taxation will then occur only with respect to interstate transactions. For
example, if State X adopts a nondiscriminatory manufacturing tax measured
by unapportioned gross receipts, State Y adopts a nondiscriminatory whole-
saling tax measured by unapportioned gross receipts and a taxpayer happens
to manufacture in State X and sell in State Y, multiple taxation will occur,
although it cannot occur with respect to intrastate transactions. Such mul-
tiple taxation is benign under Tyler Pipe since it results from the decision
of each state to adopt a tax statute with a different formal subject matter,
and the taxpayer's unfortunate choice in locating its activities.
150. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 253. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
were of the view that as applied in Armco the internal consistency test applied
only to facially discriminatory taxes, see supra note 100, but that Tyler Pipe applied
it to a statute which was not facially discriminatory and thereby expanded it to
a test of general application. Id. at 259.
151. See supra text accompanying note 103.
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This situation is admittedly distinguishable from one in which a state
seeks (as Washington did) to tax all gross receipts it has a connection
with, either through manufacturing or wholesaling conducted within the
state, but exempts only intrastate transactions from multiple taxation,
thereby creating facial discrimination. The distinction, however, does not
have inherent constitutional significance. Unless reasons exist for hinging
the constitutionality of multiple taxation on this distinction, it is merely
a semantic distinction which represents no economic or realistic difference,
and which has no proper role in constitutional analysis. In fact, no reasons
were advanced by the Court, and none seem likely. The burden on interstate
commerce created by multiple taxation is unaffected by whether it arises
under a facially discriminatory statute. No rational basis existed for con-
cluding that Washington's facially discriminatory manufacturing tax and
another state's wholesaling tax measured by the same gross receipts were
on the same thing and therefore created a risk of multiple taxation which
discriminated against interstate commerce, while simultaneously concluding
that Washington's facially neutral wholesaling tax and another state's man-
ufacturing tax were not on the same thing and created no risk of multiple
taxation under the apportionment prong of Complete Auto.
Furthermore, the notion that Tyler Pipe applies only to facially dis-
criminatory taxes is undercut by the Court's decision in American Trucking
Association, Inc. v. Scheiner,152 handed down the same day. American
Trucking involved a Pennsylvania tax of $35 per axle which applied to all
trucks used within the state. Although the Court recognized that the tax
was not facially discriminatory, it applied the internal consistency test to
invalidate the tax.'53 Justice O'Connor, dissenting, criticized the majority
for "creating an 'internal consistency' rule of general application . . . . "154
It, therefore, appears that the internal consistency rule is not limited to
facially discriminatory statutes and the reach of Tyler Pipe is unclear.
Suppose, for example, that Washington reworded its statute to impose
a tax on gross receipts derived from the sale of goods manufactured or
sold within the state. 5 The economic effect of this statute is precisely the
152. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 303.
155. As applied to a Washington manufacturer selling elsewhere this statute
would impose a tax on an interstate sale by a local manufacturer. Prior to Complete
Auto such a tax would have been unconstitutional under Freeman v. Hewitt, 329
U.S. 249 (1946), because a tax on gross receipts from an interstate transaction was
a direct tax on interstate commerce which violated the tax immunity doctrine.
However, a tax "on manufacturing" measured by gross receipts derived from
interstate transactions was permitted as a tax on a local event indirectly affecting
interstate commerce. See American Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459
(1919). See also supra note 81. Although the distinction was strictly one of words
and was an outgrowth of the tax immunity doctrine, it also can be found in pre-
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same as the statute that was held unconstitutional in Tyler Pipe. Under
this scheme, goods manufactured and sold in Washington are subject to
a single tax measured by gross receipts. Goods manufactured in Washington
and sold elsewhere are subject to the Washington gross receipts tax because
of being manufactured within the state. They will also be taxed by the
state in which the sale occurs if that state adopts a statute identical to
Washington's. Goods manufactured elsewhere and sold within Washington
are subject to Washington's gross receipt tax, and will be taxed by the
state of manufacture if that state adopts a provision identical to Wash-
ington's. Would such a statute pass muster under Tyler Pipe?
If the internal consistency test applies, the answer is no. Arguably, the
test does not apply, because the reworded statute applies uniformly to all
gross receipts connected with Washington whether derived from interstate
or intrastate commerce and is, therefore, facially neutral. Although this
argument finds support in Tyler Pipe's suggestion that the internal con-
sistency test applies only to facially discriminatory taxes, the argument
cannot be true. If it were true, an unconstitutional tax could be made
constitutional through a mere change in words. It seems unlikely the Court
would knowingly adopt such a position in the face of Complete Auto.
Furthermore, American Trucking supports a broader application of the
internal consistency test. Although not facially discriminatory, the reworded
statute most likely would be unconstitutional because it is the economic
equivalent of the statute struck down in Tyler Pipe.
This conclusion, which seems to be dictated by the Court's Tyler Pipe
holding on the discrimination issue, does not rest easily with its holding
on the apportionment issue. It means that the risk of multiple taxation,
not facial discrimination was the critical concern that led to invalidation
of Washington's manufacturing tax on discrimination grounds. Also, since
risk of multiple taxation was the critical concern, the Court's decision
upholding the wholesaling tax which created exactly the same risk is in-
explicable."16
Complete Auto decisions applying the multiple tax doctrine. See, e.g., J.D. Adams
Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938); followed in Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91(1972). Adams held that taxes imposed by the state of manufacture on unapportioned
gross receipts derived from sales in another state violated the multiple tax doctrine,
while taxes on manufacturing measured by gross receipts derived from sales in
another state did not. The Adams Court observed that the manufacturing tax was
valid, because it was on a local activity and merely measured by gross receipts
from interstate sales; whereas the tax on gross receipts was invalid, since it was
a tax on the sale which could be duplicated by the state in which the sale occurred.
Prior to Tyler Pipe one would have assumed that Complete Auto consigned this
formalism to the junk heap.
156. Under Tyler Pipe any state may adopt a nondiscriminatory manufacturing
tax, or a nondiscriminatory wholesaling tax, and either may be measured by total
gross receipts derived from interstate sales. Since such taxes are viewed as being
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This analysis is buttressed by the Court's recent decision in GTE Sprint
Communications Corp. v. Sweet. 57 Illinois imposed a tax of five percent
on the gross charge for interstate telephone calls which either originated
or terminated within the state and which were charged to an Illinois "service
address," regardless of where the calls were actually billed or paid. An
equivalent tax applied to intrastate telephone calls. The term "service
address" referred to the location of the telephone involved in the call."5 8
For example, if a call were placed from a company's headquarters in
Arkansas to its sales office in Illinois, and was charged to the Illinois
phone, the tax applied even if the bill was sent to and paid from the
headquarters office in Arkansas. Under these circumstances, Arkansas could
also impose a tax since the call originated there and was paid there. 159 If,
however, the call was charged to the Arkansas telephone (Arkansas service
address), the Illinois tax would have been' inapplicable.
Since the Illinois tax applied to the entire charge for an interstate
telephone call, and in some circumstances, another state could impose a
tax measured by the same charge, it was challenged under the apportionment
prong of Complete Auto. The solution Tyler Pipe suggests is that no
multiple tax problem exists because one state (Arkansas in the above
example) is taxing the origination of an interstate call, while the other
state (Illinois) is taxing the termination. Each state is therefore taxing a
different thing. Contrary to the implication of Tyler Pipe, the Court
recognized that even though the tax was literally imposed upon the privilege
of originating or receiving an interstate telephone call charged -to a service
address within the state, it was nonetheless 'a tax on the call which created
a risk.of multiple taxation.'60 Relying on its earlier decisions in the sales
on manufacturing or on wholesaling, which in turn are viewed as separate activities
taxable only by the state in which they occur, each tax automatically is deemed
to be fairly apportioned.
If State A imposes a manufacturing tax measured by unapportioned gross
receipts, and State B imposes a wholesaling tax measured by the same gross receipts,
under Tyler Pipe there is no multiple taxation in a constitutional sense. However,
there clearly is multiple taxation in a practical sense. A firm manufacturing in
State A and selling in State B will be taxed twice on the same gross receipts.
If it manufactures and sells exclusively in State A or State B its gross receipts
will be taxed once. If it manufactures in State B and sells in State A it will not
be taxed at all. The purpose of the multiple tax doctrine is to avoid such special
burdens on interstate commerce. Although Tyler Pipe allows multiple taxation in
a practical sense, nothing in the opinion suggests an abandonment of the multiple
tax doctrine. That doctrine exists under the apportionment prong of Complete Auto
which was applied by the Court in Tyler Pipe. The fact it was applied incorrectly
doesn't imply its rejection.
157. 109 S. Ct. 582 (1989).
158. Id. at 586 n.6.
159. Id. at 590 n.13.
160. The Court stated: "We recognize that, if the service address and billing
location of a taxpayer are in different states, some interstate telephone calls could
be subject to multiple taxation." Id. at 590.
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and use tax cases, the Court upheld the tax only because Illinois allowed
a credit against its tax for any tax paid to another state, and the credit
precluded multiple taxation.' 61 An analogous evaluation of the wholesaling
tax involved in Tyler Pipe would have led to its demise since Washington
did not allow a credit against its wholesaling tax for a manufacturing tax
paid to another state.
V. TYLER Pn'E IN PERSPECTMvE
Because the Tyler Pipe opinion is at odds with itself, it provides little
insight for a confident prediction of how it will be applied in future cases.
It may be, as Justice Black argued in his dissenting opinion in J.D. Adams
Manufacturing Co. v. Storen,162 that the regulation of any burden on
interstate commerce resulting from the interplay of the tax laws of two
or more states is a matter for the legislature. The arbitrary result under
Tyler Pipe where the location of business activities may determine whether
gross receipts are taxed twice, once, or not at all, lends credence to the
argument. 163 Justice Black would have held unconstitutional under the
commerce clause only those taxes which, looked at alone, imposed an
unfair and discriminatory burden on interstate commerce. He would there-
fore have upheld any of the three forms of gross receipts taxation discussed
above, that is, a tax on total gross receipts derived from goods sold within
the state (the Washington wholesaling tax upheld in Tyler Pipe); a tax on
total gross receipts derived from goods manufactured within the state
regardless of where sold (Tyler Pipe indicated such a nondiscriminatory
manufacturing tax is permissible'64); or a tax on total gross receipts derived
from goods either manufactured or sold within the state (the reworded
statute which is an economic equivalent of Washington's manufacturing-
wholesaling tax partially invalidated by Tyler Pipe).
Adams Manufacturing involved a statute of the latter type. It was held
unconstitutional over Justice Black's dissent because of the risk of multiple
taxation. In striking down the tax the Court explained:
The vice of the statute as applied to receipts from interstate sales is
that the tax includes in its measure, without apportionment, receipts derived
from activities in interstate commerce; and that the exaction is of such a
character that if lawful it may in substance be laid to the fullest extent
by States in which the goods are sold as well as those in which they are
manufactured. Interstate commerce would thus be subjected to the risk
of a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed, and
which the commerce clause forbids. We have repeatedly held that such a
tax is a regulation of, and a burden upon, interstate commerce prohibited
161. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120 para. 2004 (1987).
162. J.D. Adams Mfg. Co., 304 U.S. at 316-33.
163. See supra note 156.
164. See Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 249.
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by Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. The opinion of the State Supreme
Court stresses the generality and nondiscriminatory character of the ex-
action, but it is settled that this will not save the tax if it directly burdens
interstate commerce. 65
This rationale applies not only to a tax statute which by its terms
imposes a tax on gross receipts, but also to any tax measured by gross
receipts derived from activities carried on in more than one state. The
Adams Manufacturing Court, however, chose to confine its holding to a
tax of the former type which was actually at issue in the case. It distinguished
American Manfacturing Co. v. St. Louis,'6 which had upheld a tax "on
manufacturing" measured by gross receipts from interstate transactions,
observing that "the tax in the present case is not a tax on the manufacture
but a tax on gross sales." 167
The formalistic distinction between a tax "on manufacturing" measured
by gross receipts and a tax on gross receipts was incompatible with the
multiple tax rationale which was central to the decision. In Freeman v.
Hewitt,'61 decided nine years after Adams Manufacturing, the Court in-
validated the Indiana gross receipts tax as applied to proceeds realized by
an Indiana resident from a sale of stock on the New York Stock Exchange.
It chose not to repudiate the distinction, but to adopt a different rationale.
Rather than rely on the multiple tax doctrine, it applied the tax immunity
doctrine and held the tax invalid as a direct tax in interstate commerce. 69
Since the tax in American Manfacturing tax was on the local activity of
manufacturing, it was an indirect tax on interstate commerce and permissible
under the Freeman rationale. 70
As the Court observed in Complete Auto, "Freeman was viewed in
the commentary as a triumph of formalism over substance'' It was the
modern origin of the tax immunity rule, 72 and in rejecting the tax immunity
rule the Complete Auto Court implicitly overruled Freeman. In contrast,
the Court has quoted with approval from Adams Manufacturing in at least
two post-Complete Auto decisions.7 3 Until Tyler Pipe it seemed clear the
formalistic distinction between a tax on manufacturing measured by gross
receipts and a tax on gross receipts was a useless relic of another era. The
central reasoning of Adams Manufacturing rooted in economic reality rather
than legal formalism appeared to have the support of the Court. After
165. J.D. Adams Mfg. Co., 304 U.S. at 311-12.
166. 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
167. J.D. Adams Mfg. Co,, 304 U.S. at 313.
168. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
169. Id. at 253-54.
170. Id. at 255-56.
171. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 281.
172. Id. at 279.
173. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 186
(1983); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979).
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Tyler Pipe this is no longer true. Consistent with Freeman, and contrary
to the central rationale of Adams Manufacturing, the Court has now held
that a tax on manufacturing measured by gross receipts is different in a
constitutionally significant way from a tax on wholesaling measured by the
same gross receipts.
If, as the Court's post-Complete Auto decisions seemed to indicate,
Complete Auto revitalized the Adams Manufacturing rationale, abandoned
in Freeman, any state tax, regardless of its form, measured by unapportioned
gross receipts derived from interstate transactions would have been held
unconstitutional. Imposing an apportionment requirement would have been
consistent with Adams Manufacturing and Complete Auto, and also with
the principle enunciated in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,17 4
that "the linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxation
is the unitary business principle."'71 Under this principle, income derived
from manufacturing in one state and selling in another will normally be
derived from a unitary business176 and will be subject to apportionment.'7
There is no sound reason for treating gross receipts differently from income
for apportionment purposes. 78
Perhaps the Court faltered because of its failure to separate the dis-
crimination and multiple tax issues. If the Court had applied the discrim-
ination doctrine (as it traditionally has done) to require substantial equality
of treatment for interstate and intrastate transactions under the tax laws
of a given state looked at in isolation, 179 the Court would have held the
174. 445 U.S. 425 (1980):
175. Id. at 439.
176. The manufacturing and selling activity of a single firm will generally
constitute a unitary business. See supra note 146.
177. For a discussion of how the apportionment requirement might apply to
taxes on gross receipts see Shores, supra note 11 at 155-57.
178. There may be reasons for treating gross receipts differently from income
as a matter of political choice. For example, a congressional subcommittee has
opposed apportionment of gross receipts because that "would introduce numerous
complexities into a form of taxation whose chief virtue is simplicity." Special
Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 565, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1114 (Comm. Print 1965). Such reasons, however, provide no
sound basis for distinguishing gross receipts from income as a matter of constitutional
law. -Decisions of constitutional law ought to be based on principled analysis, not
political choice. If Congress disapproves of a particular result achieved by the Court
in applying the commerce clause, it is free to overturn that result. See supra note
9. Such legislative intervention would be vastly preferable to an unprincipled Supreme
Court decision, since it would not destroy the fabric of constitutional law.
179. See supra text following note 59. Justice Cardozo reflected this view in
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937), when he said: "A state, for
many purposes, is to be reckoned as a self-contained unit, which may frame its
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Washington statute nondiscriminatory. Interstate and intrastate transactions
were treated evenhandedly under the Washington tax scheme. Both were
taxed at the single rate of .44% of gross receipts. 180 If the interplay of
Washington's tax law with that of other states had been evaluated under
the multiple tax doctrine, it seems unlikely the Court would have made
the error of ascribing significance to a factor (facial discrimination) which
has no proper role in determining whether multiple taxation violates the
commerce clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Tyler Pipe decision lacks coherence. One part of it condemns the
risk of multiple taxation as violative of the commerce clause. Another part
closes its eyes to multiple taxation by treating a manufacturing tax and a
wholesaling tax measured by the same gross receipts as taxes on different
things. This is reminiscent of the Court's pre-Complete Auto decisions
involving the tax immunity doctrine in which it was neither willing to
abandon the doctrine nor apply it in a principled fashion. The result was
a tangle of inconsistent ad hoc decisions which only served to discredit
the Court and constitutional jurisprudence. Similarly, Tyler Pipe holds that
multiple taxation of interstate commerce sometimes is unconstitutional and
sometimes is not, but provides no principled means for separating the
former from the latter. Taken together with Armco, it has generated a
new and controversial internal consistency test of uncertain scope and effect.
Nearly fifty years ago Justice Rutledge suggested that the Court would
promote clarity of consideration and of decision if the due process and
commerce clause limitations on state taxing power were approached "at
least tentatively as if they were separate and distinct, not intermingled
ones."'' That was sound advice then. It is sound advice now. It was never
heeded by the Court, and the results have been less than gratifying.
Indeed, the Court has moved in the opposite direction. Not only are
due process and commerce clause issues intermingled, but within the frame-
work of commerce clause analysis, discrimination and multiple tax issues
are now intermingled through a new internal consistency test which, in
Tyler Pipe, has produced an internally inconsistent opinion. If rational
analysis is ever to prevail in this "impoverished territory," the Court
must move toward an analytical framework which facilitates rather than
frustrates clarity of consideration and of decision. This can be accomplished,
or at least aided, by treating separately the separate problems of discrim-
ination and multiple taxation.
180. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 237.
181. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340,
353 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
182. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 265 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Complete Auto promised to abandon commerce clause analysis of prior
decisions which had "no relationship to economic realities." In a word,
it promised a method of analysis which is rational rather than irrational.
The promise is a modest one, but Tyler Pipe demonstrates that if it is to
be fulfilled the Court must do two things. First, it must avoid unnecessary
intermingling of due process and commerce clause concerns. The due process
question of whether a state has power to impose a particular tax need not
be blended (confused?) with the commerce clause question of whether
power to impose the tax has been exercised in a way which unduly burdens
interstate commerce. Second, it must untangle the multiple tax and dis-
crimination doctrines which until Armco operated independently to deter-
mine whether a tax unduly burdened interstate commerce. This can be
achieved only through abandonment of the internal consistency test which
the Court has adopted incrementally through a series of missteps beginning
in Armco and ending in American Trucking."' Treating separate things
separately would do much to clarify analysis and thus facilitate decisions
which reflect economic realities. This assumes, of course, that the Court
meant what it said in Complete Auto. If it did not, if the Court remains
wedded to artificial distinctions produced by the formalism of pre-Complete
Auto decisions, a tax on gross receipts will be treated as something different
from a tax on manufacturing measured by gross receipts, and each will
be treated as different from a tax on wholesaling measured by gross receipts.
That's simply the end of the matter, and no realignment of the analytical
framework can affect the result.
More is involved, however, than the constitutional status of taxes
measured by gross receipts. Armco and Tyler Pipe are unprincipled decisions
which recognize distinctions that are without practical or economic signif-
icance. Like Freeman v. Hewitt they represent a triumph of formalism
over substance. If artificial and formalistic reasoning is to survive Complete
Auto, with respect to gross receipts taxes, spill-over effects will inevitably
reach other forms of taxation. The highly touted revolution" 4 in state
taxation of interstate commerce will turn out to have been a chimera.
183. Professor Hellerstein has asked the rhetorical question-is "internal con-
sistency" foolish? Hellerstein, "Is Internal Consistency" Foolish?: Reflections on
an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 MIcH. L. Rlv.
138 (1988). His explicit answer is "no." Id. at 188. He goes on to conclude,
however, that the internal consistency test added nothing to the pre-existing commerce
clause jurisprudence and may exacerbate confusion and uncertainty. It would seem
that a new test which adds nothing but confusion is foolish, and ought to be
abandoned.
184. See supra note 35.
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